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ABSTRACT
The current refugee crisis demands novel legal solutions, and
new ways of summing the political will to implement them. As a
matter of national incentives, the goal must be to design mechanisms
that discourage countries of origin from creating refugees, and
encourage host countries to welcome them. One way to achieve this
would be to recognize that persecuted refugee groups have a financial
claim against their countries of origin, and that this claim can be
traded to host nations in exchange for acceptance. Modifications to
the international apparatus would be necessary, but the basic legal
elements of this proposal already exist. In short, international law
can and should give refugees a legal asset, give host nations
incentives to accept them, and give oppressive countries of origin the
bill.
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INTRODUCTION: THE WORLD'S LEAST WANTED
We are living in "an age of unprecedented mass
displacement,"1 and although the crisis is not new,' it seems to be
worsening. In 2015, the number of displaced people rose to an
all-time high of 65 million.3 Millions of those people are what
international law calls refugees: people fleeing persecution in their
home countries.4 Many of them have nowhere else to go. As a result,
some of "the world's least wanted ' 5 are literally floating between
countries that persecute or reject them.
Consider the Rohingya, a Muslim minority residing primarily
in Myanmar, who some observers have called the most persecuted
people in the world. 6 Despite their numbers-around 1.3 million
Rohingya live within the nation's borders-they lack some of the most
basic legal protections. Since the passage of a nationality law in 1982,
they are not even recognized as citizens.' Many Burmese regard them
1. Somini Sengupta, 60 Million People Fleeing Chaotic Lands, UN Says,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2015, at Al (quoting United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees Antonio Guteres).
2. Two decades ago, Peter Schuck wrote, "The world is awash in refugees."
Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT'L.
L. 243, 244 (1997) [hereinafter Schuck, Modest Proposal]; see also Stephen H.
Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker' Bill of Rights in a Non- Utopian World, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 619 (2000) ("It is becoming trite to observe that in recent years
few issues have been as wrenching or as intractable as the refugee crisis.").
3. Somini Sengupta, Record 65 Million Displaced by Global Conflicts, UN
Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2016, at Al. 2014's total of 60 million had been the
previous record. Sengupta, supra note 1.
4. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person with a "fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion, [who] is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
adopted July 28, 1951, art. 1 A(2), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 150
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Convention]. Those terms, and our
proposal, do not reach economic migrants, internally displaced persons, and those
fleeing civil war and natural disasters.
5. Mark Dummett, Bangladesh Accused of 'Crackdown' on Rohingya
Refugees, BBC (Feb. 18, 2010), http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hi/8521280.stm.
6. The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, THE ECONOMIST
(June 13, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21654124-myanmars-
muslim-minority-have-been-attacked-impunity-stripped-vote-and-driven; Katrin
Kuntz, Burma's Stateless Muslims: The World's Most Persecuted Minority,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 3, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/an-
account-of-the-flight-of-the-rohingya-minority-from-burma-a-1036589.html.
7. Jane Perlez, Rise in Bigotry Fuels Massacre Inside Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES
[48.1:1
Competing for Refugees
as illegal settlers from Bangladesh,8 and the nation's former
president-a democratic reformer, in many other respects-has said
that they should be deported. 9
There is, however, no place for them to go. An outbreak of
riots in 2012 resulted in deaths, the internal displacement of more
than 100,000 Rohingya (most of them now living in camps), and a
declaration of emergency that has permitted the Burmese military to
exercise control of the Rakhine State, where the Rohingya are
concentrated.10 In 2015, thousands of Rohingya began to flee to
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and other nearby countries, which
have been reluctant to accept them. " Although it is surely not the
sole motivation, 12 cost is a primary reason that these nations have
given for turning the Rohingya away. 13
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/asia/rise-in-bigotry-
fuels-massacre-inside-myanmar.html? r=0; MOSHE YEGAR, BETWEEN
INTEGRATION AND SECESSION: THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF THE SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES, SOUTHERN THAILAND, AND WESTERN BURMA/MYANMAR 59 (2002).
8. Kate Hodal, Trapped Inside Burma's Refugees Camps, the Rohingya
People Call for Recognition, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/20/burma-rohingya-muslim-refugee-
camps.
9. Myanmar's Rohingyas: No Help, Please, We're Buddhists, THE
ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21564909-when-
offending-muslim-world-seems-small-price-pay. Unfortunately, it is unclear
whether the recent victory of Nobel Peace Prize Winner Aung San Suu Kyi's
National League for Democracy in November 2015 will do much to change things.
Jennifer Rigby, Aung San Suu Ky Aide: Rohingya Are Not Our Priority, THE
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/asia/burma/12006208/Aung-San-
Suu-Kyi-aide-Rohingya-are-not-our-priority.html; Aung San Suu Kyi Tells UN
that the Term Rohingya' Will be Avoided, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/aung-san-suu-kyi-tells-un-that-
the-term-rohingya-will-be-avoided.
10. Hodal, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., Beh Lih Yi, Malaysia Tells Thousands of Rohingya Refugees
to "Go Back to Your Country" THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/13/malaysia-tells-thousands-of-
rohingya-refugees-to-go-back-to-your-country (discussing Malaysia's recent
declaration that Rohingya refugees are not welcome and will be turned away or
deported upon arrival).
12. VITIT MUNTARBHORN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN ASIA 16-17, 68, 98,
116, 143 (1992) (arguing that many Asian states seek to avoid the arrival of
refugees with differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds).
13. See Bill Powell, No Rest for the Rohingya, NEWSWEEK (May 25, 2015),
http://www.newsweek.com/no-rest-rohingya-refugees-myanmar-335187 (noting
that, upon temporarily accepting a limited number of refugees, "Malaysia and
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In short, the Rohingya face persecution at home and rejection
abroad. Leadership in Myanmar has a history of hostility toward the
ethnic group and has explicitly described them as "ugly ogres." 14 At
the same time, neighboring states are reluctant to take on a sizeable
burden not of their own making. As for the Rohingya, the very wrongs
they have suffered make it hard for them to improve their lot-they
have had few opportunities to accumulate the skills or resources that
would make them desirable to other nations.
As the plight of the Rohingya suggests, refugees fleeing
persecution face an unfriendly world. The Rohingya's tragedy is
extreme, but such "unwanted" people abound from Pakistan to South
Sudan, and Central African Republic to Syria. The historical causes
of any refugee crisis are complicated and unique, often rooted in
religious difference, ethnic tension, or the scars of colonialism. But
the problem can also be partially understood through the lens of
economic incentives: the challenge is to make countries want the
unwanted. 15
From the perspective of host nations, accepting refugees
typically means feeding, clothing, and sheltering them, and giving
them access to social services like education. The costs of providing
these services can be high, are heavily concentrated among the
countries that can least afford them 16 (not to mention the refugees
themselves 1), are compounded when the refugees come from different
Indonesia... insisted that the international community needed to get involved to
bear some of the resettlement costs .... ).
14. Envoy calls refugees 'ugly as ogres; SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb.
14, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/world/envoy-calls-refugees-ugly-as -ogres-
20090213-8759.html (reporting that a senior foreign official put this insulting
observation in writing).
15. Robert J. Shiller, Economists on the Refugee Path, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-research-
contribution -to -asylum-reform-by-robertj --shiller-2016-01 ("Under today's
haphazard and archaic asylum rules, refugees must take enormous risks to reach
safety, and the costs and benefits of helping them are distributed capriciously. It
does not have to be this way. Economists can help by testing which international
rules and institutions are needed to reform an inefficient and often inhumane
system.").
16. Sengupta, supra note 1 ('When refugees flee their own countries, most
of them wind up in the world's less-developed nations, with Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan hosting the largest numbers."); James C. Hathaway, Moving Beyond the
Asylum Muddle, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/moving-
beyond-the-asylum-muddle/ [hereinafter Hathaway, Asylum Muddle].
17. Dan Bilefsky, Denmark Moves to Seize Valuables from Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2016, at All.
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ethnic or religious groups than those in the host country, and are
especially unpalatable when they are the result of some other nation's
malfeasance.
These costs and their impact on national incentives drive a
wedge between the goals of international refugee law and the reality
of its enforcement. 18 International refugee law provides refugees with
legal entitlements: direct prohibitions on persecution, remedies for
displaced individuals, and the rule of non-refoulement, which forbids
nations to send them back to situations of persecution. These rules
occasionally have bite, such as when the international community
intervenes to prevent or remedy the kinds of situations that create
refugees in the first place. And some countries accept refugees
(sometimes permanently 19) out of a sense of moral, political, or legal
obligation. There are also rare occasions when compensation is paid
to victims of persecution.20 The current regime has saved or improved
millions of lives and deserves to be celebrated. But the size of the
problem is such that millions still need help, as the current crisis
vividly demonstrates.
Our starting point, therefore, is a system that is falling
short. 21 Its shortcomings provide a benchmark against which to
compare our proposal and its own potential weaknesses.22 In an ideal
18. For a thoughtful treatment of how the desire to treat migration in
economic terms interacts with other developments in immigration policy, see
CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, THE NEW POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND THE END OF
SETTLER SOCIETIES (2016).
19. James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International
Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution- Oriented
Protection, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 119 (1997) ("Even though international
law presently requires no more than the provision of rights -regarding temporary
protection, Northern states, in law or in practice, have historically afforded
refugees permanent status." (internal citation omitted)).
20. See infra notes 95 100 and accompanying text.
21. Alexander Betts, The Political Economy of Extra-territorial Processing:
Separating "Purchaser'from Provider'in Asylum Policy 1 (Eval. & Policy Analysis
Unit UNHCR, Working Paper No. 91, 2003) (explaining that both the UNHCR
and the UK are actively working to develop new approaches to refugee policy); see
also Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 247 (arguing that the system "fails
to afford adequate protection to the enormous and growing number of people
fleeing from what seem to be, and often are, intolerable conditions-and that it
needs fixing").
22. C£ Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal
Filfeen Years Later in THE NATION STATE AND IMMIGRATION: THE AGE OF
MULTICULTURALISM (Anita Shapiro et al. eds., 2014) (recognizing as a starting
point the inadequacies of the current regime and using those weaknesses to build
alternative proposals).
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world, nations would neither create nor reject refugees, and rules to
that effect would be perfectly enforced.23 In our imperfect world,
however, nations-armed with the shield of sovereignty-respond not
only to moral obligations, but to economic and political incentives as
well.2 4 Solutions to the refugee crisis must do more than reiterate
aspirations; they must give countries of origin and host nations
reasons to behave well.25
Some scholars have proposed market-based approaches to the
refugee problem, including proportional sharing of burdens among
host nations (especially within a region), tradable quotas held by
those nations, and compensation for refugees and host nations. 26 But
these proposals generally have not caught on, in part because host
nations do not have enough reason to share the burdens. Instead,
each has incentives to free-ride on others' acceptance of refugees.
Indeed, it has been difficult to engineer a burden-sharing treaty even
within the European Union (EU), where the nations in question are
already sharing burdens and therefore could readily make tradeoffs.27
23. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 115 ("Even as armed conflict and
human rights abuse continue to force individuals and groups to flee their home
countries, many governments are withdrawing from the legal duty to provide
refugees with the protection they require.").
24. Hathaway, Asylum Muddle, supra note 16 ("[A]s an interstate regime,
refugee protection should be operationalized in a way that maximizes its
compatibility with state interests."); Legomsky, supra note 2, at 620 ("The world
we inhabit consists of sovereign states that jealously guard their territories, their
wealth, and their ethnic composition. In this world, there is economic, cultural,
environmental, ethnic, and political resistance to the admission of refugees.").
25. Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Restructured Safe Havens: A Proposal for
Reform of the Refugee Protection System, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 1, 29 (2000) ("There
is ... no quid pro quo that could induce the [global] North to dismantle all
barriers to access and to grant temporary protection, much less routine
permanent admission, to all refugees who arrive at its borders. Ready access to
durable asylum in the North is simply not on the table."); Hathaway & Neve,
supra note 19, at 206 ("Ready access to durable asylum in the North is simply not
on the table, and an approach to refugee law reform that assumes otherwise is
bound to fail.").
26. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 118; Schuck, Modest Proposal,
supra note 2, at 270-88; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Selim Can Sazak, Footing the
Bill: Refugee-Creating States' Responsibility to Pay, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 29,
2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-07 -29/footing-bill.
27. See Ullrich Fichtner et al., Migration Crisis: The EU's Shikwrecked
Refugee Plan, SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 23, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/how-eu -promises -to-introduce -refugee -quotas -failed-a- 1040
226.html; Dan Bilefsky & Alison Smale, Dozens of Migrants Drown as Europe Is
Pressured to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2016, at A7 ("Despite the evidence that
migrants from the Middle East and Africa are continuing to flee war and poverty
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In view of these challenges, we ask whether there is a
market-based solution through which host nations can be given better
incentives to accept refugees, countries of origin can be discouraged
from oppressing them, and the refugees themselves can be
empowered. Our proposal is as follows: the international community
would give persecuted refugee groups financial claims enforceable
against the countries that expelled them. 28 The groups could then
trade those claims to other countries as a way to offset the costs of
acceptance. The new host nations could then seek to enforce the
claims directly, use them to offset any debts owed to the
refugee-creating nation, or sell the debt to a third party such as a
hedge fund specializing in the enforcement of sovereign debts.
This mechanism would give bad countries another reason not
to create refugees and good countries another reason to accept them.
If accepting refugees carried with it a financial claim, then countries
would have more incentive to welcome them and-depending on the
size of the claim-even to compete for them. The possibility of these
financial claims might be a better deterrent to oppression than
censures or unenforceable legal judgments. Moreover, and unlike
prior market-based proposals, this approach would give agency to the
refugees themselves, rather than just treating them as costs on a
ledger. Our plan would only reach a subset of refugees (those facing
persecution in host nations against whom viable financial claims
could be made), but it could form part of a larger and more
comprehensive plan.29
in their home countries and will strike out to Europe again in huge numbers this
year, European leaders have taken no major new steps to curb the flow.").
28. Oxford scholar Guy Goodwin-Gill recently advanced a proposal along
similar lines, advocating the seizure of the frozen assets of refugee creating states
so as to provide compensation to those nations providing refugees with shelter.
Goodwin-Gill & Sazak, supra note 26. We are in full agreement with the goal of
forcing the refugee creating states to internalize some of the costs of the problem
it has created. The proposal, though, is limited. It would only work when the
refugee -creating state in question had frozen assets that could be seized. That
situation is likely to be rare.
29. For example, our focus on the use of sovereign debt to incentivize
acceptance of refugees would mesh well with proposals that would use bond
financing for that purpose. See George Soros & Gregor Peter Schmitz, 'The EUIs
On the Verge of Collapse' An Interview, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/02/11/europe-verge-collapse-interview/.
It might also facilitate the creation of a "matching" market for refugees and host
nations. See, e.g., Will Jones & Alexander Teytelboym, Choices, Preferences and
Priorities in a Matching System for Refugees, 51 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 80
(2016).
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We see three basic and interlocking principles in
international refugee law: a prohibition on the kind of oppression that
creates refugees in the first place, an obligation of other nations to
protect the refugees they receive (non-refoulement), and-more
tentatively-a right to compensation for those refugees. Right now,
none of these is fully effective. We are trying to make the third of
these rights, compensation, more effective. That, we hope, would
improve the first two rights as well. Our proposal will not solve the
global refugee crisis. But if we can use existing legal tools to help
countries see refugees as more of a benefit than a burden, we might
generate some improvement.
I. How IT CAME To THIS
The tragedy of the current situation is so apparently
senseless that it is worth asking how we got here in the first place.
Past efforts to explain and address the problem hold lessons-some
cautionary-about future solutions.
A. The Promise and Limits of International Refugee Law
Basic international law, embedded in foundational legal
instruments, prohibits the kind of persecution that generates
refugees.30 When violated, international refugee law provides a
secondary set of rights designed to protect those fleeing persecution.
These rights are reflected in various instruments of
international humanitarian and human rights law, and in regional
agreements, but their foundation is the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees,3 1 which emerged in 1951 as a way
of managing post-war refugee flows in Eastern Europe. That
situation, however, differed from crises elsewhere and afterwards.
Because post-war refugees were primarily European, their cultural
assimilation was regarded as relatively straightforward, and
recipient nations often found them useful to "meet acute post-war
labor shortages."32 In 1967, the Convention was amended to recognize
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. Convention, supra note 4.
32. James Hathaway, Can International Refugee Law Be Made Relevant
Agai 2? Th U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 14, 15
(1996).
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the global nature of the problem and the need for corresponding
global solutions.33
Thus amended, the Convention provides refugees with a
range of legal rights,34 the "most critical" of which is the right of
non-refoulement,35 which forbids nations from returning refugees to
countries of origin where they would face continuing persecution.
36
These rights have saved or improved the lives of millions, and we see
no reason to attempt total renegotiation of the Convention today.37
Yet, the law has failed to save millions of others who might be
thought to fall within its purview. In part this is because, aside from
the rule of non-refoulement, refugee law does not always make
especially strong claims on receiving states.38 More fundamentally,
however, the international regime "does not impose these duties on
any specitk state. ' 39 Refugees gain legal rights only against whatever
country they are able to reach.4" Recognizing this, potential host
nations, especially wealthy ones,41 sometimes try to prevent refugees
33. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 622-24, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
34. See generally RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (James C.
Hathaway ed., 1997) (discussing, inter alia, states of reception's legal obligation to
provide refugees some form of durable protection where safe repatriation is
impossible).
35. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 160.
36. Convention, supra note 4, at 176 ("No Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.").
37. Hathaway, Asylum Muddle, supra note 16 ("The moment has come not
to renegotiate the Refugee Convention, but rather at long last to operationalize
the treaty in a way that works dependably, and fairly.").
38. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 252-53.
39. Tally Kritzman-Amir & Thomas Spijkerboer, On the Morality and
Legality of Borders: Border Policies and Asylum Seekers, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
1, 6 (2013) (emphasis added).
40. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 141 ("Under the present protection
system, the government of the asylum state is solely responsible for delivering
and funding the protection of all refugees who arrive at its jurisdiction.").
41. Ryan Bubb et al., The Economics of International Refugee Law, 40(2) J.
LEG. STUD. 367, 379 (2011) ("Since it was adopted in 1951, the convention regime
has become less attractive to wealthy states, which have made it increasingly
difficult for refugees to claim their rights under the convention.").
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from ever setting foot on their territories and thereby gaining legal
claims against them.42
The most prominent way of doing so is "interdiction," wherein
nations intercept refugees before they set foot on sovereign soil. The
instances of such behavior abound.43 Potential host nations also use
"visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 'safe third country'
jurisdictional barriers to asylum claimants, 'readmission agreements'
leading to chain refoulement,... and [refugees'] summary removal at
the border. ' 44 For similar reasons, nations like Hungary, Croatia, and
Slovenia are currently taking extreme measures to help refugees get
to other more attractive host nations like Austria, Sweden, and
Germany, so that they will not stay and burden them. 45
42. Randall Hansen calls this a process of "thickening borders." See
Randall Hansen, State Controls: Borders, Refugees, and Citizenship, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 253, 260-61
(Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. eds., 2014).
43. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 124-25 (noting examples from
Vietnam, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zaire); Rick Lyman, Hungary Seals Border
With Croatia in Migrant Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2015, at Al (describing
Hungary's 216-mile razor wire fence); Australia Hlas -Lit "New Low'Armd Claims
of Payment to People Smugglers, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jun/13/pressure-on-abbott-over-
claims -people -smugglers -were -paid -to-turn -back-boats (reporting allegations that
Australian government paid refugee smugglers to turn back). See also Hirsi
Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 9, 13, 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 23,
2012) (declaring illegal Italy's "push back" policy with regard to African migrants);
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding U.S. interdiction
policy against challenges involving both domestic law and the Convention).
44. Deborah Anker et al., Crisis and Cure: A Reply to HathawayAeve and
Schuck, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295, 297 (1998); Betts, supra note 21, at 2
("[M]any states . . .are engaged in a race-to -the -bottom in asylum standards,
increasing entry restrictions while reducing their level of welfare provision to
claimants as a means of reducing their relative and absolute burden of asylum-
seekers."); Arulanantham, supra note 25, at 15 (discussing domestic manipulation
of refugee definition); Savitri Taylor, The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare?:
The Difference Between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing, 6 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 23-25 (2005) (describing Australian agreements with Nauru
in 2001 and Papua New Guinea in 2002).
45. Hungary is seeking to close its borders, since even the burden of
allowing refugees passage through it appears to be too much. See William Booth
& Michael Birnbaum, Asylum Seekers Confront Repeated Rejection as Europe
Puts Up Roadblocks, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/europe/as-europe-tightens-borders-germany-mulls-
tougher-rules-at-end-of-refugee-trail/2015/09/18/6cb66596-5c93-1 e5-8475-
781cc9851652 story.html.
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Nations engaging in these practices argue that doing so falls
within the basic sovereign prerogative of controlling borders.4 6 This
has traditionally been a powerful argument. Although sovereignty's
grip may have slackened somewhat in recent years and many have
argued that national sovereignty must give way to refugees' rightful
needs,4" such claims of sovereignty regularly trump refugees' claims.48
But this does not mean that refugees' rights under
international law are irrelevant. The fact that nations go to great
lengths to prevent refugees from setting foot on their shores suggests
that those nations would respect the obligations they would incur as a
result.4 9 And yet their willingness to take such actions in order to
avoid those obligations demonstrates that the goals of international
refugee law are ultimately subject to national incentives.
International refugee law can be conceptualized as a global
public good, akin to clean air.50 In its pure form, it has the
characteristics of public goods, such as being non-rivalrous and
non-excludable. No citizen of the world can be excluded from it and its
use by one refugee does not diminish the right of another to use it.
The reality, however, is quite different. While there is little
dispute that host nations have a legal obligation to comply with the
doctrine of non -refoulement, those same nations can take significant
steps to avoid taking on that obligation in the first place. For
example, nations have leeway in deciding who gets to land on their
soil, whose fears of persecution are legitimate, and so on.51 In
46. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 117 ("[G]overnments increasingly
believe that a concerted commitment to refugee protection is tantamount to an
abdication of their migration control responsibilities.").
47. Veit Bader, The Ethics of Immigration, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 331, 340
(2005) (arguing that state sovereignty must yield in cases of "well-founded fear of
being persecuted").
48. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 247 ("[T]he nation-state has
indeed impeded and confounded human rights goals .... "). On this general
phenomenon, which stands as an obstacle to all of international human rights
law, see ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014).
49. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 128 ("In most cases, though,
Northern governments have respected the human rights of refugees who manage
to enter their territories, no doubt prompted by legal cultures receptive to holding
states formally accountable to their treaty obligations.").
50. Bubb et al., supra note 41, at 367; Astri Suhrke, Burden-sharing
During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective Action Versus National
Action, 11(4) J. REFUGEE STUD. 396, 400 (1998).
51. For a discussion of these problems and citations to materials discussing
them in detail, see notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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economic terms, while the citizens of all nations benefit from the fact
that the international system provides them with a kind of insurance
in case they ever were to become refugees, individual countries and
their citizens have an incentive to try and shirk their responsibilities
to provide shelter to refugees.5 2 The more that countries try to free
ride on the efforts of their fellow nations, the higher the burden on
those that are complying and the greater their incentive to also shirk.
The challenge-as for any plan involving a "team" setting
where individual members have an incentive to shirk 53 -is setting
conditions in which an equilibrium can be reached where the team
members (host nations) bear appropriate costs (accepting the right
number of refugees). As noted, individual nations will have incentives
to avoid their duties to accept refugees, because-as in any balanced
budget sharing scheme-they want to be able to claim a share of the
benefits without fully bearing the costs.
We make no claim to having a perfect or complete solution to
this category of problems.54 But our proposal may help ameliorate it
by altering the "budget" itself 55 By creating a new pot of money (the
liabilities of countries of origin), we can both incentivize more host
nations to participate (thus increasing the size of the "team") and
alter the incentives of those that do.
In our proposal, the incentive comes in the form of a financial
claim against the nations who are responsible for creating refugees in
the first place. These financial claims would supplement the factors
that drive nations to accept refugees in the current system-likely a
combination of altruism and reputational benefits that go with
nations showing themselves to be good global citizens.
56
52. The free rider problem that exists in the international context with
public goods such as clean air has been much discussed. E.g., William Nordhaus,
Climate Clubs: Overcomng Free-riding in International Climate Policy:
Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, 105 AMER. ECON.
REV. 1339 (2015).
53. Cf Bengt Holmstrm, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324
(1982).
54. The best-known solution to this problem is to establish one actor-a
"budget-breaker"-who has control over the budget, and can solve the potential
free-rider problem by imposing team penalties sufficient to align incentives
properly.
55. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 279 ("Protective capacity is
largely, though not exclusively, a function of national wealth.").
56. On the importance that altruism likely plays in the current system, see
Bubb et al., supra note 41. Researchers have studied the importance to nations of
maintaining reputations as good global citizens in a variety of settings ranging
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A critic might ask whether the addition of financial incentives
in a situation where actors were previously motivated by altruism
will "crowd out" those altruistic tendencies.57 This should not be a
problem, so long as the incentive scheme is designed to make sure
that participants perceive the incentives as supporting existing
altruism and enhancing both their sense of self worth and others'
perceptions of it. Rather than "crowding out," such a system can lead
to "crowding in"-increasing altruism as a result of financial
incentives. 58
Taking in refugees will still fundamentally be an act of
altruism (and seen as such) because any compensation that the host
nation receives is unlikely to fully offset the actual and perceived
costs. And litigating the refugee claim (or selling it) will, at worst, be
a way of lessening the burden on the altruistic population that is
taking them in. At best, it could be seen as a way of enabling host
nations to provide an even better level of hospitality to the refugees
than they were providing otherwise. Put differently, it would be as if
the international community were providing a matching contribution
for the charitable contribution made by the host nation.59
from sovereign debt repayment to compliance with human rights treaties. See,
e.g., Amanda Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blamfig: Using Events
Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT'L STUD Q. 1 (2012);
Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 94 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 273
(2010); MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
SOVEREIGN DEBT THROUGH THREE CENTURIES (2007). In the current crisis itself,
for example, many view Germany as seeking to establish itself as a global leader
through its generosity. See, e.g., Gavin Hewitt, Germany: Moral Leader or
Misguided?, BBC (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.bbe.com/news/world-europe-
34185970; Why Germany is Taking in so Many Refugees, CBCNEWS (Sept. 14,
2015), http://www.ebe.ca/news/world/why-germany-is-taking-in-so-many-refugees-
the -benefits -and -risks- 1.3226962.
57. For a survey, see Agnes Festre & Pierre Garouste, Theory and Evidence
in Psychology and Economics About Motivation Crowding Out, 29 J. ECON. SURV.
339 (2015).
58. For an explanation, see Bruno Frey, Crowding Out and Crowding In of
Intrinsic Preferences, in REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
78 79 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds., 2012). For supportive empirics in a different
context, see Nicola Lacetera et al., Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood
Donations, 340 SCIENCE 927 (2013).
59. On the use of matching contributions in tackling the crowding out
problem, see James Andreoni & Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Entirely Due to
Fundraising 95 J. PUBLIC ECON. 334 (2009).
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Further, to the extent the altruism in question is at least
partially motivated by the desire to signal good citizenship,60
pursuing the claim on behalf of the refugees might have the effect of
revealing to other nations in the international community and to the
domestic population, in a credible fashion, information about the
efforts the host nation has made to be a good global citizen. It would
therefore be responsive to national incentives while also
strengthening international norms. Because the debt here would be
owed by an oppressive country of origin-a quintessential bad actor-
even the act of collecting it could be seen as a way of standing up for
international norms, and not simply pursuing self-interest. 61
B. National Incentives
There are many reasons why nations reject refugees, but
perhaps the most straightforward and commonly invoked reasons
involve lack of capacity. 62
Nations that accept refugees have a basic legal and moral
obligation to provide them with essentials such as food and shelter.63
Many host nations also find it necessary in practice to expend further
resources on jobs, education, and the like.6 4 National budgets
60. The literature on altruism identifies two sources of altruism: pure
altruism and warm glow. Warm glow encompasses signaling benefits, which
includes concerns about self-image, reputation, and esteem. See generally James
Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A
Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects, 77 ECONOMETRICA
1607 (2009); Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,
96 AMER. ECON. REV. 1652 (2006).
61. See generally Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
62. Selim Can Sazak, An Argument for Using Frozen Assets for
Humanitarian Refugee Situations, 68(2) J. INT'L AFF. 305, 306 (2015) ("The
world's collective response capacity and resources are being stretched to the
limit." (quoting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos)); Peter H. Schuck, A Response to the
Critics, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 385, 387 (1999) [hereinafter Schuck, Response]
("To deny the burdens that refugees sometimes impose on first asylum states is to
blink reality and put one's head in the sand.").
63. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 252 (describing the
"minimum" relief to refugees as including "food, clothing, shelter, and
information").
64. Tally Kritzman-Amir, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of
Responsibility Sharing in Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 355, 359 (2009); see
also Eiko Thielemann, Editorial Introduction, 16 J. REFUGEE STUD. 225, 227
(2003) ("Recipient states . . . appear to be as aware about direct costs of
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typically do not set aside money for these purposes, so resources are
often diverted from the needs of the domestic population.
Other costs may emerge over time, such as perceived threats
to the host nation's security, cohesion, and political stability.
65
Countries will go to great lengths to avoid these costs. To take one
example, in 1995 the government of Tanzania ordered its army to
turn away refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, arguing that
"[p]rotecting and assisting refugees has brought new risks to national
security, exacerbated tensions between states and caused extensive
environmental degradation.
66
It is not simply the size of the burdens that is problematic,
but the way in which they are distributed-not based on fault or
capacity, but on proximity and accessibility. 6' As a result, the burdens
subsistence, schooling, healthcare or the determination process as they are about
the more indirect costs of social integration.").
65. U.N. High Comm'r Refugees, Note on International Protection:
International Protection in Mass Influx, 1 18, U.N. Doe. A/AC.96/850 (Sept. 1,
1995) ("Many low-income developing countries whose resources are already
strained face destabilizing social and economic effects from a sudden, mass influx
of refugees."); Amitav Acharya & David B. Dewitt, Fiscal Burden Sharing, in
RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW, supra note 34, at 111, 123 (noting
that refugees challenge host nations' "capacities to ensure social cohesion and
economic and political management in the face of such intrusion."); Hathaway &
Neve, supra note 19, at 138 ("Particularly in the North, resistance to honoring
duties owed to refugees follows from a growing resistance on the part of
governments to externally imposed changes to the composition of their societies.");
Legomsky, supra note 2, at 620 ("Refugees often come from cultures far different
from those of the host populations; real frictions can result. There can also be both
domestic political reasons and foreign policy reasons not to welcome particular
groups.").
66. Augustine Mahiga, A Change of Direction for Tanzania, REFUGEES
MAG. (1997), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/refugeemag/3b6960009/
refugees -magazine -issue- 110-crisis -great-lakes -change -direction-tanzania.html.
67. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 117 ("[N]either the actual duty to
admit refugees nor the real costs associated with their arrival are fairly
apportioned among governments. There is a keen awareness that the states in
which refugees arrive presently bear sole legal responsibility for what often
amounts to indefinite protection."); E. Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-sharing, and
the Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 689 (2015)
("[G]eographic proximity to conflict and porousness of borders remain the primary
determinants of which nations bear the heaviest cost, with disastrous effects.").
Similar equity-based objections arise with regard to non-persecuted refugees as
well-it is, for example, at the root of the debate in Europe about how to respond
to "economic refugees" from North Africa, or those fleeing conflict in the Middle
East. Hathaway, Asylum Muddle, supra note 16 ("[I]n all of the talk about the
European refugee crisis, we have lost sight of the fact that just three countries
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of refugee-hosting are concentrated in the global South,6 8 often among
the countries least financially able to bear them.69 This is, in part, a
result of the fact that refugees tend to originate in the global South
and seek refuge in the nearby countries that are most accessible to
them. 
70
Although the scale and horror of today's refugee crisis may be
unique, it involves problems of incentives that are common to other
areas of law and international cooperation.7 1 Refugee protection, as
noted earlier, has the characteristics of a global public good. And as
with any public good, each potential host nation, responding to its
own domestic legal pressures and perceived self-interest, has an
incentive to avoid paying its share.7 2 Countries of origin, meanwhile,
have insufficient disincentive to oppress their own people because
bordering Syria - Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - have received more than ten
times as many Syrian refugees as the rest of the world combined."). Because our
focus here is on persecuted refugees only, we hold aside the questions raised by
these other classes of people.
68. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 146 (noting that eighty percent of
the world's refugee population is already protected in the less-developed world);
Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 252 (noting that the distribution of
refugee flows is "decidedly lumpy" and not concentrated in Europe).
69. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 141 ("States closest to countries of
origin and those least able to afford systematic border controls or technologies of
deterrence will inevitably receive the most refugees. Consequently, the poorest
countries of the South are legally required to meet the needs of most of the world's
refugees.").
70. Bubb et al., supra note 41, at 371 ("Under the 1951 convention, the
burden of hosting refugees largely falls on states that are geographically
proximate to refugee producers.").
71. Alan 0. Sykes, International Cooperation on Migration: Theory and
Practice, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 320 (2013) (noting a "familiar" proposition in
"economic analysis of international law-national governments acting
noncooperatively tend to consider the benefits of policy to their own citizens and
constituents but tend to ignore or discount the effects of their policy choices on
foreigners").
72. Betts, supra note 21, at 5 (citing M. Gibney, Liberal Democratic States
and Responsibilities to Refugees, 93(1) AM. POL. Sci. REV. 177 (1999)); RICHARD
B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 66 (1984) ("As the 'system' malfunctions, the politics of refugee assistance
and settlement are rather a diplomatic prisoner's dilemma. Any state unilaterally
deciding to be generous thereby eases pressure on non-cooperating states and
reduces the incentive on the international community to develop the type of
strong machinery for cooperation which is needed.").
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they do not bear the full costs of their actions. 3 As for the refugees
themselves, they are often given legal "rights" that have little chance
of enforcement without state cooperation. Any successful solution
must therefore take government incentives-including financial
ones-into account. 
4
Our proposal is premised on the assumption that nations
respond to incentives. Of course, there are some underlying causes of
migration-famine, extreme poverty, ecological disaster-over which
countries of origin do not always have control (and therefore have no
financial responsibility in our scheme), and for which changed
incentives will have little impact. Our proposal is unlikely to help in
those scenarios, but neither is it likely to worsen them. 
7 5
C. Prior Market-Based Solutions
In an effort to address national incentives, some scholars and
reformers have proposed market-based solutions to the refugee crisis,
with varying levels of conceptual and political success.
The most prominent market-based approaches to the refugee
problem involve "burden-sharing" among potential host nations. 6
Details vary, but the basic idea behind these proposals is to pool
responsibilities and resources in order to smooth risk, avoid shirking,
and achieve a more equitable distribution of costs.77 Typical elements
of the plans include quotas based on the ability of host nations to
73. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 359 ("[T]he policies or natural
conditions of the refugees' home States create a cost not internalized by the States
themselves, but rather assumed by others.").
74. Arulanantham, supra note 25, at 4 ("[T]hat states provide for the
protection of refugees at all is quite remarkable .... [The fact] that the system is
one constructed by states, and therefore, for states, imposes substantial
restrictions on any realistic proposal for refugee reform."); Hathaway & Neve,
supra note 19, at 137.
75. See infra Section III.B.
76. See, e.g., G.J.L. COLES, PROBLEMS ARISING FROM LARGE NUMBERS OF
ASYLUM-SEEKERS: A STUDY OF PROTECTION ASPECTS 36 40 (1986); GERASSIMOS
FOURLANOS, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INGRESS OF ALIENS 155, 159 61 (1986); Atle
Grahl-Madsen, Ways and Prospects, 21/30 AWR BULL. 278 (1983); Michael J.
Parrish, Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a
Basis for Refugee Protection, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 223, 224 n.3 (2000) (noting "a
paradigm shift from conceiving of refugee law as primarily emphasizing the
resettlement and asylum of refugees, to focusing on burden sharing between
receiving states, temporary protection, and ultimate repatriation").
77. Betts, supra note 21, at 6.
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accept refugees 8 (sometimes with attention to the particular refugee
group at issue 9 ), regional cooperation,8" off-shore processing of
refugees,81 cross payments between countries (typically from rich
nations in the North to poorer nations in the South 82 ), and using some
form of trade in order to benefit from comparative advantages with
regard to responsibilities like processing, protection, and long-term
hosting. The authors of some plans argue that they could be largely
funded with the money that industrialized states would no longer
need to spend policing their own borders against refugees. 83
Following five years of consultation with leaders in
international refugee law and policy, James Hathaway and Alexander
Neve proposed an approach that would focus on "common but
differentiated responsibility" within regional groups. In this plan, all
states would have a duty to provide asylum and to contribute
something to the financial and human burdens, but could assume a
range of protection roles based on their own resources and
circumstances .8 4 Another such plan, created at around the same time,
is the market in tradable85 refugee quotas described by Peter Schuck
in a series of articles and New York Times op-eds.8 6 In this system,
states could satisfy their quotas either by providing physical
78. Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees and Refugee Law in a World of
Transition, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 65, 74 (1982).
79. Steven H. Atherton, International Moral Obligations: An Integrated
Approach, 3 GEo. IMM. L.J. 19, 34 35 (1989) ("[A]n ideal method would determine
the relative costs for each country associated with admitting a given alien and
direct that alien to the country where the costs are least.").
80. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 143-44.
81. Betts, supra note 21, at 2.
82. Bubb et al., supra note 41, at 367.
83. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 147 ("Most, or even all, of the
funds required could be garnered from the savings realized by the dismantling of
non-entree mechanisms and from the significant reduction in the number of
fraudulent claims to be processed in the North."); see also id. at 153 (noting that
industrialized nations spend far more money on non-entree mechanisms than on
direct aid to refugees in the global South).
84. Id., at 143 45.
85. Arulanantham, supra note 25, at 26 n.90 (describing this as "[t]he most
important difference between them").
86. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 248; Schuck, Response, supra
note 62, at 385-88; Peter H. Schuck, Creating a Market for Refugees in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/opinion/creating-a-
market-for-refugees-in-europe.html; Peter H. Schuck, Share the Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/O8/13/opinion/share-the-
refugees.html.
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protection for refugees or by paying other nations that are better
suited to do so, most likely those in the region of origin.
Burden-sharing proposals have arguably gained some traction
in practice,87 but by and large they have stalled. Indeed, the EU was
considering a burden-sharing proposal when Schuck, Hathaway, and
Neve made their proposals two decades ago.88 That consideration
continues today, with little indication that it will come to fruition
soon.89 The bottom line is that "there have not been enough incentives
for States to create fair responsibility-sharing mechanisms."90
A second set of market-based solutions advocates
compensation payments to refugees (and sometimes to host
nations),91 usually from repressive countries of origin9 2 but also
because many states recognize some sort of obligation to support
87. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 254 59 (pointing to the
Comprehensive Plan of Action developed in response to refugee flows in Southeast
Asia in the 1970s); G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), art. 2.2, U.N. Declaration of Territorial
Asylum (Dec. 14, 1967) ("[W]here a State finds itself in difficult in granting or
continuing to grant asylum, states individually or jointly through the UN shall
consider, in a spirit of international solidarity, appropriate measures to lighten
the burden on that State.").
88. See Karoline Kerber, Temporary Protection: An Assessment of the
Harmonisation Policies of European Union Member States, 9 INT'L REFUGEE L.
453, 455 (1997).
89. See, e.g., Nils Muiznieks, You're Better Than This, Europe, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinion/youre-better-than-
this-europe.html; Hathaway, Asylum Muddle, supra note 16 ("Despite the fact
that consensus on a comprehensive means to operationalize the [burden -sharing]
treaty was reached, no action was taken by either the UNHCR or governments to
move the project forward on the international stage.").
90. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 392; see also Ronald C. Smith,
Outsourcing Refugee Protection Responsibilities: The Second Life of an
Unconscionable Idea, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 137, 137 38 (2004) ("[C]reating
an international market to trade refugee protection responsibilities
is ... foolhardy because it is not even in the selfish best interests of nations to
export this responsibility .. " (criticizing Betts, supra note 21)).
91. Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of
Asylum, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 532, 533 (1986) ("State responsibility for the creation of
refugees includes compensation for both refugees and countries of asylum.").
92. Goodwin-Gill & Sazak, supra note 26; Yoav Tadmor, The Palestinian
Refugees of 1948: The Right to Compensation and Return, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 403, 403-04 (1994) (arguing that "refugees should have a limited right to
return, and that their primary remedy ought to be compensation"); R.Y. Jennings,
Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
98, 113 (1939).
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those in need.93 The most prominent advocate of compensation in
recent decades was Luke Lee, a scholar and US State Department
adviser on Population, Refugees and Migration.9 4 Lee argued that
international law establishes a duty on the part of countries of origin
to compensate both the refugees they create and the countries that
must care for them. 
9 5
As described below, there is some support in international law
and practice for the notion that countries of origin owe such a debt.96
As Grotius himself put it, albeit in a different context, "fault creates
the obligation to make good the loss." 9' And in the past few decades,
major developments in international human rights law have clarified
that victims of human rights violations have a right to remedy, which
includes compensation and other forms of reparation like restitution,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.
And yet, as with burden-sharing, the right to a remedy in
general (and to compensation in particular) has not provided
anything like a broad-based solution. The reasons for this are easy to
93. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the
Democratic and Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 107, 141 42 (Amy Gutmann ed., Shierry Weber
Nocholsen trans., 1994) (arguing that First World states are obligated to accept
refugees from the Third World, in part due to the consequences of colonialism);
THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 97, 201 (1st ed. 2002) (arguing that rich nations
owe an obligation to help those in poverty, because of the costs that the current
global financial system imposes on them); James Souter, Towards a Theory of
Asylum as Reparation for Past Injustice, 62 POL. STUD. 326, 326 (2014) ("[There is
a] special obligation on the part of states to provide asylum to refugees for whose
lack of state protection they are responsible, whether through their military
inventions, support for oppressive regimes or imposition of damaging economic
policies.").
94. In addition to his academic writing, Lee was chair of the International
Law Association the year that it issued a Declaration on the matter of refugee
compensation. See International Law Association, Draft Declaration of Princikles
of International Law on Compensation to Refugees and Countries of Asylum
(Report of the 64th Conf, 1991), 64 INT'L L. PROC. 333 (1991).
95. Lee, supra note 91, at 532; see also Sazak, supra note 62, at 307
(proposing a system that would use the frozen assets of a refugee -producing
nation to help pay for the refugees it produces); Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at
374 (noting that responsibility considerations "could be applied to impose
responsibility on States of origin, when their own harmful, negligent, or
oppressive policies cause refugees to flee to other countries").
96. See infra Section II.B. 1.
97. Lee, supra note 91, at 536 n.23 (citing H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIS 430 (Carnegie Endowment trans., 1646 ed. 1925)).
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imagine. Imposing costs on countries of origin might further
radicalize them. Refugees are usually in no position to sue their
countries of origin, let alone collect a judgment. Gaining a right to a
remedy is only one step towards realizing it. Our goal is to suggest a
better mechanism of implementation.
D. The Need for a Holistic, Incentives-Based Approach
We distill a few lessons from these past efforts.
First, the debate over market-based approaches has
sometimes proceeded as if the choice is between refugee "markets"
and refugee rights. However, market approaches need not displace
other legal mechanisms for the protection of refugees, including
particularized national obligations like the right of non-refoulement.98
Market solutions can help provide remedies for rights violations that
the current regime has been unable to address.
Second, any approach to the refugee problem depends in large
part on giving potential host nations sufficient incentive to
participate.9 9 The market proposals described above attempt to do so
by, for example, permitting rich and poor nations to capture gains
from trade. We go a step further. Instead of creating a tradable
obligation of nations to accept or pay for refugees, we create a
tradable asset that refugees can give to those nations. Better still, if
the core of that asset can be an obligation on the part of the nation
that created the refugee problem, we can increase the disincentives
for nations to create such problems in the first place.
Third, one of the strengths of market approaches is that they
take sovereignty and national incentives seriously. 100 We assume that
states act largely out of self-interest.101 Reform proposals are
therefore likely doomed to failure unless they satisfy the
98. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 169 ("While each state party
assumes particularized obligations under the Refugee Convention, nothing in the
current legal regime prevents governments from working together and sharing
resources to meet those duties.").
99. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 381 (arguing that "Hathaway and
Neve are unable to explain why States would be willing to form these collective
arrangements for responsibility sharing").
100. Asha Hans & Astri Suhrke, Responsibility Sharing, in RECONCEIVING
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW, supra note 34, at 159 ("[A]ny burden sharing
scheme must be based on the realpolitik assumption that legal obligations and
humanitarian considerations alone rarely suffice to persuade states to admit
refugees .... ").
101. Cf Anker et al., supra note 44, at 299 (criticizing this view).
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governments' concerns, and in particular their concern to not be seen
as transferring large amounts of resources from their voting public to
new migrants. Overcoming the cost objection will not result in
acceptance of all refugees-many will still be rejected because of
security concerns, xenophobia, or other reasons. But any marginal
change in incentives should lead to a corresponding marginal change
in outcomes.
Fourth, while we would welcome the resolution of these issues
through treaties, we suspect that, at least in the short term,
customary international law will continue to play a prominent role. 102
The fact that nations have been unable even to agree on regional
burden-sharing proposals suggests that broad agreement is not yet
feasible. Renegotiation of the Refugee Convention and its Protocol
could be disastrous, 10 3 but even those instruments do not have
universal assent. This is true, for example, of the major nations
involved in the Rohingya crisis-Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and
Thailand-none of which have ratified the Convention or Protocol. 104
At least in the meantime, then, we think that the answers will lie
beyond the specific text of treaties.
Fifth, most existing market approaches tend to ignore an
aspect of the refugee creation equation that we think is key. The
refugee crisis involves at least three categories of actors: countries of
origin, host nations, and the refugees themselves. 105 Burden-sharing
proposals generally focus on the relationships and incentives among
host nations vis-h-vis refugees; compensation proposals generally
focus on the relationships and obligations among countries of origin
102. See infra Section I.A (describing basis in CIL for proposition that
creation of refugees represents a legal violation).
103. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 156.
104. Eleanor Albert, Backgrounder: The Rohingya Migrant Crisis, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 17, 2015), http://www.efr.org/burmamyanmar/
rohingya-migrant-crisis/p36651.
105. This connection has been noticed before. In the 1990s, "[w]hile
responding to refugee situations in countries of asylum, the [UNHCR] also started
focusing activities in countries of origin, seeking to prevent and contain refugee
movements .... Invoking the human right to remain in one's country of origin,
the [UNHCR] sought to ensure that people were not forced to flee from their
homes in the first place." Rep. of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 12, 3, U.N. Doe. A/48/12, at 4
(1993); see also Nafees Ahmad, Refugees: State Responsibility, Country of Origin
and Human Rights, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTS. & L. 1, 2 (2009) (noting the
"complex triangular relationship" among the country of origin, refugee, and
receiving state).
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and refugees. A comprehensive approach would recognize the
connections between all three groups and would design legal rules to
coordinate and balance their sometimes-competing interests and
obligations, while making refugees actors in the market, rather than
the objects of it. 106
II. CREATING AN ASSET FOR THE REFUGEES
Our proposal is based on a few basic propositions regarding
international law. First, nations violate international law when they
create refugees through persecution. Second, international law can
provide a remedy for this violation in the form of a financial claim
running in favor of the refugees and against their parent nation.
Third, the international community can and must put in place the
enforcement mechanisms that give value to the refugees' asset.
This is partly an argument for reform and partly an argument
for better recognition and enforcement of existing principles. Many of
these key elements exist already or can largely be implemented using
existing institutions. In situations where those rules or institutions
are already working, we do not seek to displace them. But we
recognize that our scheme would demand a great deal of existing law
and institutions, and perhaps even the creation of a new
international body. Given that legal and institutional reform are so
strongly in focus at the moment, we do not think of this as a fault.
A. The Legal Violation
A state violates international law-including international
human rights law-when it persecutes a subset of its people to such a
degree that causes them to have to flee to another state.
In claiming as much, we rely on the existing international
standards for who counts as a refugee.1 7 These standards have
106. Indeed, our proposal could also be read to implicate a fourth
category-potentil host nations. In the current system, actual and potential host
nations engage in some economic negotiation, for example, when actual host
nations (Germany, say) use the political capital they gain by accepting refugees to
extract contributions, often financial ones, from potential host nations. Our
proposal would not displace this kind of negotiation, but would create something
like an exchange rate between receiving refugees and making payments in lieu of
receipt.
107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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important limits. They do not cover people fleeing horrors other than
persecution, nor do they reach those who are internally displaced
within their home countries.1 0 8 Further, in keeping with existing
principles, we would limit liability to acts or omissions that are
imputable to the state concerned.1 9 This would exclude things like
natural disasters and famine, as well as invasions or occupation, for
which states bear no responsibility. (Of course, states' responses to
those shocks-discriminatory distribution of aid, for example-can
create or contribute to refugee flows and would be subject to the
rules.)
Both forms of international law-treaties and customary
law-provide support for our basic proposition. Relevant treaties and
conventions include the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of
Refugees, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, and the
International Law Commission's 1980 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, each of which prohibits the kind of persecution that
creates refugees.1 0 As Luke Lee argued three decades ago, "the
country that turns its own citizens into refugees is in violation of a&l
the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." '
Even so, treaty law is likely unable to provide a fully
satisfactory solution. First, oppressive nations might not have signed
the relevant treaties. Second, the treaties might not have provisions
108. The seeming arbitrariness of these distinctions has long been noted.
See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-32, 51 (1983) ("Why mark off
the lucky or the aggressive, who have somehow managed to make their way
across our borders, from all the others?"); Arulanantham, supra note 25, at 9 n.25
("A valid criticism of the current refugee system is that it works best for those who
have the money or political connections to travel far away from their countries of
origin."); Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 179 ("Stayee communities are
composed of persons who are not displaced from their homes. Some may not have
been affected by the events that forced the refugees and internally displaced from
their homes, while others may have been directly affected, but were unable to flee
or were fiercely determined to remain.").
109. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
thirty-second session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility [1980], 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 30, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2).
110. Lee, supra note 91, at 536-40. A complete list of citations would
include nearly all forms of hard international human rights law embodied in the
basic human rights treaties.
111. Id. at 539.
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for the kind of damages we describe below. 112 And third, the terms of
the treaties might allow individual nations to withdraw easily. 113
Where treaties fail, customary international law (CIL) may
offer a better solution.114 CIL uses treaties as a foundation and fills
gaps in the treaties where formal, written consensus is unclear or
impossible. 115 Unlike with treaties, the traditional understanding is
that states cannot withdraw from CIL, especially not for CIL rules
falling within the human rights rubric. 116
As a formal matter, a legal norm reaches the status of CIL
upon meeting a two-part test. First, the norm must "result from a
general and consistent practice of states," and second, states'
adherence to this widespread practice must stem "from a sense of
legal obligation" known as opiniojuris. 11 Our proposal does not fully
satisfy the formal definition, if it is followed strictly.118 But in
practice, international tribunals almost never comply with the formal
definition of CIL. Instead, tribunals applying CIL engage in a process
akin to common law decision-making. They typically consult
international treaties and conventions for evidence that nations
aspire towards fixing a particular problem in a particular fashion. 119
112. See infra Section II.B.
113. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV.
1579 (2005) (describing the reasons for and mechanisms to enable unilateral exit
of treaties by states).
114. A third possibility lies with "general principles" of law, referenced in
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, which apparently can be found extrapolating from
widely shared domestic legal principles. Although we do not pursue it in depth
here, the general principles approach is likely to have particular appeal to those
who think of international law as being consent-based.
115. See Andrew Guzman & Jerome Hsiang, Rein igorating Customary
International Law, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD 275, 275-76 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) [hereinafter CUSTOM'S FUTURE]
(emphasizing that CIL is "a tool that can promote cooperation in situations where
consent-based rulemaking proves impractical").
116. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208 (2010).
117. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 102(2) (1987).
118. For this reason, Hathaway is skeptical regarding the usefulness of
custom as a source of refugee rights. See JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 26 (2005). On the empirics that
suggest that this skepticism might not be warranted, see Stephen J. Choi & Mitu
Gulati, Customary International Law: How do Courts do it, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE,
supra note 115, at 117.
119. Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as
Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE, supra note 115, at 34; see also
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To the extent possible, they may also look to the practices of states to
find confirmation of the aspirations they find articulated in the
treaties, although this kind of evidence is often sparse. 120 There is no
magic formula in terms of the numbers of pieces of evidence or the
types of evidence that would satisfy a tribunal as to the existence of a
new rule of CIL. That said, the breadth and strength of treaties and
conventions supporting the rule we describe far exceed that available
in most cases where CIL claims have been accepted by international
tribunals. 121
Our claim regarding the violation of international law seems
straightforward enough. And it would be, except for the principle of
sovereignty. Although norms of sovereignty have eroded in the second
half of the twentieth century,122 they remain among the strongest in
international law and have often frustrated the goals of international
human rights and refugee law. 123 More challenging than establishing
a violation, then, is describing a remedy.
B. The Remedy
Where a violation of international law has been established,
the next question is whether that violation can be translated into a
legal right to compensation for refugees.
1. The Legality of Compensation
Under the current system, even when a breach of
international law is recognized, it is host nations-not the countries
of origin-that end up providing a remedy, in the form of protection
Brian Lepard, Customary International Law as a Dynamic Process, ih CUSTOM'S
FUTURE, supra note 115, at 62 (emphasizing the forward looking or aspirational
aspect of CIL determination, from the perspective of solving collective action,
coordination, and public goods problems); John Tasioulas, Custom, Jus Cogens
and Human Rights, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE, supra note 115, at 95 (making a similar
claim in the human rights context, albeit from a moral perspective).
120. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 118, at 117.
121. See id.
122. On the erosion of sovereign immunity on both the commercial and
human rights sides, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Relevance of
Law to Sovereign Debt, 11 ANN. REV. L & Soc. Sci. 395 (2015); Andrea Bianchi,
Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 237
(1999).
123. POSNER, supra note 48; Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 247.
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for refugees. Morally and politically, this is backwards. 124 While
nations sometimes have a moral or legal duty to remedy harms they
did not cause, that should not absolve the initial wrongdoer. Of
course, the opposite is also true: the inability or unwillingness of a
persecuting nation to make things right does not absolve other
nations of their duty to help. The question for our purposes is who
has the primary duty to pay. As a legal matter, a wide range of
international sources (again, more than enough to satisfy a finding of
CIL) suggest that states that create a refugee problem must be
responsible for the costs. 125
Such sources are at least as old as international refugee law
itself 126 For example, the 1948 Progress Report of the United Nations
Mediator on Palestine provided that "payment of adequate
compensation for the property of those choosing not to return[] should
be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation
commission,"' 12' a return-or-pay theme that would be echoed in later
124. Ahmad, supra note 105, at 2 ("[W]hy should the burden be entirely on
other States? Should it not in the last analysis fall back on the country of
origin?"); Lee, supra note 91, at 536 n.23 (citing GROTIUS, supra note 97).
125. Schuck notes a similar possibility, albeit in the limited context of
inter-state suits designed to deter bad conduct rather than to incentivize
acceptance: "The norm [of state sovereignty] also prevents a state that has borne
the costs of another state's refugee -generating policies or practices from suing the
source state to recover those costs. Establishing such a cause of action
could-assuming that the source state's causal responsibility could be proved and
the resulting judgment could be enforced-render a root cause strategy far more
effective." Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 262 n.72.
126. Lee, supra note 91, at 536 n.23 (citing GROTIUS, supra note 97). See
also Jennings, supra note 92, at 113 (noting, in the context of refugee flows, that
"[i]f the conduct of the state of origin be in the first place illegal, it seems to follow
that it is under a duty to assist settlement states in the solution of the problem to
which it has given rise.").
127. Supplement to Part III of Progress Report of the United Nations
Mediator on Palestine, 17 3, U.N. Doc. A/648, 3 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11),
(1948). This text was essentially adopted in Resolution 194(111) of December 11,
1948, which "resolve[d]" among other things that "compensation should be paid
for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to
property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made
good by the Governments or authorities responsible." G.A. Res. 194 (III), 3 U.N.
GAOR, pt. 1, Res. 21, 24, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The U.N. Conciliation
Commission for Palestine (CCP) pursued the issue, albeit with limited success,
throughout the 1950s, and the same basic ideas emerged in the Geneva Accord,
which provided both that "[t]he Parties recognize the right of states that have
hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration" and also that "[r]efugees shall be
entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property." Don
Peretz, Palestinian Refugee Compensation 2 (The Center for Policy Analysis on
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documents, including the Bosnian accords.128 In 1981, the General
Assembly "[e]mphasize[d] the right of refugees to return to their
homes in their homelands and reaffirm[ed] the right, as contained in
its previous resolutions, of those who do not wish to return to receive
adequate compensation." '129 In more general terms, Article 2(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees a
right to remedy,130 and Article 14(6) says that a person who has been
the victim of a miscarriage of justice "shall be compensated according
to law." 1
31
A related line of argument under international law suggests
that countries of origin owe compensation not only to the refugees
they create, but to the nations that-because of practical necessity, as
well as their own legal and moral obligations-must house them. 132
By pushing refugees into other nations, the argument goes, countries
of origin violate the sovereignty of those other nations by forcing
them to accept people within their borders (and, consequently, to pay
for them). 133
Palestine, Info. Paper No. 3, May 1995); Geneva Accord: A Model
Israeli -Palestinian Peace Agreement, arts. 7(3), 7(2).
128. Eric Rosand, The Rizght to Compensation in Bosnia: An Unfulfilled
Promise and a Challenge to International Law, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 113,
115-16 (2000) ("One of the foundational principles of the peace negotiated at
Dayton was that all refugees and displaced persons would be given the right to
return to their pre-war homes or receive compensation for their home should they
choose not to return .... ").
129. G.A. Res. 36/148, 3 (Dec. 16, 1981) (creating the U.N. Group of
Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of
Refugees).
130. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
s/gnature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2(3), S. Exec. Doe. E 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (obligating parties "[t]o ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy").
131. Id. art. 14(6), at 177.
132. S.C. Res. 687, 16 (Apr. 8, 1991) (finding Iraq "liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage . . . or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait").
133. Christian Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Country of Origin,
in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW ISSUES 59, 71-72 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996) ("If [a state]
pushes ... its own citizens out of its territory, fully knowing that the victims of
such arbitrariness . . . will eventually have to be admitted somewhere else on
purely humanitarian grounds, it deliberately affects the sovereign rights of its
neighbors ... ").
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This theory of liability was articulated as early as 1891, when
U.S. President Benjamin Harrison claimed:
The banishment, whether by direct decree or by not
less certain indirect methods, of so large a number of
men and women is not a local question. A decree to
leave one country is, in the nature of things, an order
to enter another-some other. This consideration, as
well as the suggestions of humanity, furnishes ample
ground for the remonstrances which we have
presented to Russia .... 134
The logic behind such country-to-country claims for
compensation has been accepted in other legal contexts. One example
is the famous Trail Smelter arbitration, which involved pollution
across borders but has been used (somewhat apologetically) to
analyze the refugee problem as well. 135 In Trail Smelter, the tribunal
held that
under the principles of international law,.... no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence. 136
134. Lee, supra note 91, at 555 (quoting U.S. DEP'T STATE, 1891 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT xiii (1891)). That
same year, the Institut de Droit International reported:
A state cannot, either by administrative or judicial procedure, expel its own
nationals whatever may be their differences of religion, race, or national origin.
Such an act constitutes a grave violation of international law when its
international result is to cast upon other territories individuals suffering from
such a condemnation or even placed merely under the pressure of judicial
proscription.
Lee, supra note 91, at 555-56 (quoting 11 ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 278-79, art. XI (1891)). See also Regles Internationales sur
l'Admission et l'Expulsion des Etrangers, adopted by the Institut on Sept. 12,
1892, 12 ANNUAIRE at 219 (1892)).
135. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 105, at 21.
136. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A 1905, 1965 (1938 & 1941).
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Damages were awarded as a result of the breach. 137
The complication is sovereign immunity-a state might be in
breach of its obligations and yet immune to claims for money
damages. As noted above, state sovereignty and related concepts like
immunity have long been serious obstacles to the enforcement of
international refugee law. This point was recently driven home by the
ICJ's decision in the Jurisdictional Immunities case, which held that
Germany might have violated international law (even jus cogens)
through the actions of its military during World War II, but that no
remedy was available to the plaintiffs in the domestic courts of Italy
and Greece. 131 If the country being sued is one that has consented (via
a treaty) to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal that has been
set up to tackle these issues, sovereign immunity is not an issue since
the country has waived it for conflicts within the treaty's scope. But if
not, or if no such tribunal exists, then suit is likely to be brought in a
domestic court and the question of immunity will be central, as it was
in the Jurisdictional Imm unities litigation.
The possible assertion of sovereign immunity presents an
obstacle, but there is nothing essential or inevitable about it. After
all, sovereignty and sovereign immunity are legal fictions that are
given by the international legal community to groups of people with
territory so as to enable the functioning of the international legal
system. 139 When a sovereign invoking the power of that legal fiction
uses it in a way that undermines the system, the benefit of the fiction
can (and perhaps should) be forfeited. In some ways, this seems to be
happening already.
After the failure of the international community to prevent
the horrors of World War II, and in light of the dramatic increase in
cross-border commerce over the past few decades, sovereignty's grip
has weakened in at least two ways. First, on the human rights front,
international law now contains more significant prohibitions against
countries committing human rights abuses against their citizens,
including prohibitions on genocide and torture. There is also growing
137. See generally John D. Wirth, The Trail Smelter Dispute: Canadians
and Americans Confront Transboundary Pollution, 1927-41, 1 ENVTL. HIST. 34
(1996).
138. For a discussion of the case, see Stefan Talmon, Jus Cogens after
Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished, 25 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 979 (2012); Carlos Esposito, Jus Cogens and Jurisdictional Immunities of
States at the International Court of Justice: A Conflict Does Exist, 21 ITALIAN
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 161 (2012).
139. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 122, at 6.
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support for the position that countries cannot rely on sovereignty to
shield themselves from remedies for these violations. Indeed, some of
these basic human rights rules fall under the rubric of what are
called jus cogens norms, which are treated as more fundamental than
sovereignty itself. 140
Consider the growing support for two remedial principles that
would alter the traditional conception of sovereignty in cases of
serious human rights violations. First, under the principle of
remedial secession, regions subject to widespread humanitarian
abuse are entitled to secede from their nations. 141 Second, and along
the same lines, the "Responsibility to Protect" would require the
international community to intervene in cases of severe oppression,
despite the territorial integrity of the oppressive nation 142-one
recent proposal extends the Responsibility to the refugee context. 14 3
Acceptance of these principles is far from universal and their
implementation is far from perfect. The point is simply that
sovereignty is not absolute, and that abuse of one's own citizens can
be a justification for removing the entitlements that sovereign status
brings with it.
A case can be made that international law does not recognize
sovereign immunity as a defense to claims of compensation for the
140. See, e.g., Andrea Bianchi, Human Rizghts and the Magic ofJus Cogens,
19 EuR. J. INT'L L. 491, 491 (2008) (discussing the almost intrinsic relationship
between human rights and jus cogens norms).
141. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 220-23 (1978); T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the
Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3-27
(Catherine Brdlmann et al. eds., 1993); ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY,
AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 335
(2004). But see Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory
and (Lack o.) Practice, 6 ST. ANTONY'S INT'L REV. 1, 37 (2010).
142. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Oct. 24, 2005)
(vesting responsibility to the U.N. Security Council, and other regional
organizations as appropriate, to protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity, when national authorities have failed to
protect their own populations); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (outlining the
intervening steps the international community should take when a sovereign
nation has failed to protect its population); cf Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of
the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319, 319 (2012) (expressing
disappointment in the implementation of this responsibility).
143. See generally Achiume, supra note 67.
2016]
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
kinds of violations described here. 144 The Declaration of Human
Rights, for example, states that every person has "the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted by the constitution or by
law."145 Scholars have noted that the principle of compensation has
"developed and, arguably, [is] implicit in conventions such as the
Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and Annexed Regulations, and the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
146
These are not simply abstract legal principles; nations have
claimed (and occasionally succeeded in obtaining) such compensation
in the past. The US claimed compensation from Russia based on
Russian persecution of Jews in the late 1800s; India did likewise with
Pakistan and refugees from Bangladesh in the 1970s. 147 Along these
lines, the International Law Association's 1990 Draft Declaration of
Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees and
Countries of Asylum notes multiple cases where nations paid
compensation for creating refugees or their equivalent. The most
prominent example involved payments that were made by the
German government to the state of Israel for the resettlement of
refugees after World War II.148
A critic could argue that many of these are instances where
the country paying the reparations did so out of a sense of moral
obligation rather than legal obligation. This is a fair point. The
compensation scheme we have in mind would arguably require a
change in international law by making such payments mandatory.
Our point here is to show that it would not be a wholesale change. We
envision developing the evidence of voluntary practice and of
aspirational norms into a doctrine of CIL, as is the case in so many
other areas of international law.
144. Sazak, supra note 62, at 307 ("[T]here exists within the Charter of the
United Nations, a legal and doctrinal basis for such a practice [of seizing national
assets to pay for refugees' care] to be adopted under the auspices of the UNSC.").
145. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess. U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
146. Tadmor, supra note 92, at 433; see Eyal Benavisti & Eyal Zamir,
Private Claims of Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 330 (1995) ("[T]he principle that refugees are entitled to
compensation for their lost property is gradually gaining recognition.").
147. Lee, supra note 91, at 561.
148. See International Law Association, supra note 94, at 339-43.
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The second major set of changes in the traditional conception
of sovereignty comes in the commercial arena. Countries engaging in
cross-border commercial transactions are deemed to have waived
their immunity to suit in foreign courts. 149 When a sovereign uses the
power of that legal fiction in a fashion that undermines the legal
system, it should no longer be entitled to it. This was, after all, the
basic logic behind the shift from absolute sovereign immunity to
restrictive immunity in international law. Restrictive immunity came
into being as a doctrine during the Cold War era because sovereigns
did business as private actors (usually via state-owned firms from
socialist nations) and then attempted to claim sovereign immunity
when some counterparty pursued a claim of damages against them. 150
This is also what we see happening in sovereign veil-piercing cases
where a sovereign in default might be trying to do business through a
subsidiary so as to avoid exposing its assets. 151
Our goal is to take these two developments-the erosion of
sovereignty in cases involving human rights violations, and waivers
of sovereign immunity in international markets-and marry them in
a way that would help refugees.
2. Who Can Claim Compensation?
The next question is who can claim the compensation. As an
initial matter, our system would award the claim to groups of
refugees, rather than to individuals.
Almost by definition, and certainly in practice, mass
persecution tends to involve situations wherein people are oppressed
as members of a group. It seems sensible to begin considering
remedies at the same scale. Moreover, from a forward-looking
perspective, preserving groups as such can help facilitate durable
solutions, including repatriation, 152 while helping refugees preserve
149. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 68, 69 (2014).
150. See, e.g, STEPHEN MCCAFFERY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL
LAW 191-92 (2006); see also supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
151. Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 122, at 7-8; see generally Brandon
Rice, States Beha ving Badly: Sovereign Veil Piercing in the Yukos Affair (Oct. 12,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2673335 (describing the difficulties of trying to enforce an arbitral
award against the Russian Government due to the veil of sovereignty).
152. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 140 ("[R]epatriation will often by
unsuccessful when family and collective social structures of refugees have not
been preserved during the period of protection abroad, when refugees are denied
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their own distinct social identities and structures. An effective
group-based refugee scheme could also allow the rules and
institutions of asylum law to focus more directly on individual asylum
seekers.
There are downsides to this group-based approach. As a
practical matter, it might be hard to identify groups or to impute
collective decisions to them. But these are not insurmountable
problems. The country of origin's own actions will often define the
group in need of compensation-one can, for example, begin by asking
who Myanmar defines (and oppresses) as Rohingya. Though refugees
sometimes disperse, they often "flee to bordering states or to more
distant states to which their access is facilitated by transport and
existing migration networks, or where they have valuable contacts
such as family members." '153 Partly as a result, it will sometimes be
possible to identify the equivalent of democratic leadership within
refugee communities. 15 4 (Of course, this will have to be done with
care, so that the refugees' own leadership structures do not
themselves become instruments of marginalization.)
Another way to resolve this complication about decision-
making would be for the relevant body (perhaps the UNHCR) to
appoint trustees for the refugees. The trustees could then make
decisions for the group, focusing especially on the interests of the
weakest and least desirable refugees. The strongest and most
"valuable" refugees-the strong, wealthy, and young-are more likely
to find a country willing to accept them. 155
Even as it solves a potential collective action problem,
however, this solution would not fully resolve tension between the
group's interests and those of the individual. Too strong of a focus on
groups could distract from the fact that the Refugee Convention
opportunities to develop their skills and personalities in the asylum state, or
when the place of origin sees the return of refugees as a threat or burden.").
153. Anker et al., supra note 44, at 298-99.
154. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 174 (citing proposal by Robert
Gorman and Gaim Kibreab that formal standing be given to a "Refugee
Development Council (RDC), which would become both a means of reflecting
needs and interests, and of unleashing the community's skills and energies");
id. at 179 (further proposing "Country of Origin Development Councils (CODCs)"
to serve a corresponding role in countries of origin).
155. Refugees: The Numbrs, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
globalissues/briefingpapers/refugees/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) ("Children
constitute about 41 percent of the world's refugees, and about half of all refugees
are women.").
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creates individual rights. 156 But individual rights, such as
non-refoulement, can co-exist with group-based remedies.157 As in
other areas of law, our goal is to seek aggregate solutions to
individual wrongs. Individual refugees could choose to opt out of the
group remedy by seeking asylum elsewhere. This choice would mean
partially forfeiting their share of the claim,158 but for some (the strong
and desirable), that might be a reasonable choice to make. If this
seems unfair, consider that immigrants likewise cannot cash out their
interests in the countries they leave.
3. How to Calculate the Compensation
The crux of our remedy is a financial claim. For our proposal
to work, such a claim must be quantifiable.
Calculation of the remedy would be contested and
complicated, but not necessarily any different in character from other
valuations incorporated in law. In the course of passing regulations,
governments regularly "put a price on life." '159 Class actions and mass
tort suits apportion compensation across a broad range of people
whose injuries vary in their particulars. And inter-sovereign disputes
over matters like post-conflict reparations are just as politically
charged and hard to quantify as the matters we have in mind here.
Moreover, current refugee-focused policies and proposals already
have to face difficult questions of quantification: how many troops or
aid shipments are needed to avert genocide, what "quota" of refugees
to allocate, 16 or how many refugees a state can accept. 161 Indeed,
156. Anker et al., supra note 44, at 306; id. at 308 ("These studies are out of
step, in important respects, with the development international human rights law
after World War II, which emphasizes individual rights under the rule of law.").
157. Lee, supra note 91, at 552 ("This is not meant to condone the creation
of individual refugees. Rather, deplorable as the creation of even a single refugee
may be, it entails no serious injury to or 'burden' on countries of asylum other
than a shared outrage at man's inhumanity to man.").
158. There is no reason why they would have to give up their direct,
individual claims to lost property and the like.
159. In the United States, the going rate appears to be roughly $9 million.
Cass R. Sunstein, The Mischievous Science ofRichard Thaler, THE NEW RAMBLER
(2015), http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/the-mischievous-
science-of-richard-thaler.
160. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 277 ("The overall burden is
defined as the number of refugees who need to be offered protection ... during a
given time period. This number would be calculated by an international agency to
be described below, and would be adjusted as unanticipated refugee emergencies
occurred." (internal citation omitted)).
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Turkey and the EU recently did a trade where the rights of refugees
were explicitly quantified. Turkey agreed to take back refugees who
had passed through the country and into Greece illegally, and
promised to constrain the flow of new refugees towards the EU, in
exchange for approximately 6 billion Euros, visa-free travel for
Turkish citizens into the EU area, and revived EU accession talks. 162
Put differently, while quantification of the precise value of refugee
might be difficult, crass, and imprecise, it can be (and is) done. Plus,
the alternatives to attempting such calculations may well be leaving
the cost-whatever its size-on the refugees themselves.
Calculating the debt owed to persecuted refugees would
therefore be similar in kind to other well-established remedial
practices. But, like any other remedy, it should be crafted with
specific goals in mind. At least three goals are crucial: compensation,
deterrence, and incentive. The first is focused on refugees, the second
on countries of origin, and the third on host nations.
The first goal is to compensate refugees for what they have
lost. In this respect, we build on existing legal principles, including
the international law rules discussed above. Indeed, the "most
common remedy for the breach of an international obligation is
adequate compensation, which may be defined as 'the payment of
such a sum as will restore the claimant to the position the claimant
would have enjoyed had not the breach . . .occurred."'' 163 The most
straightforward aspect of this compensation would be for lost
property, denial of livelihood, and other "direct" costs to the
refugees. 164
In general, international actors have been more comfortable
with these kinds of compensation than with other less tangible
161. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 372.
162. See Europe's Murky Deal With Turkey, THE ECONOMIST (May 28,
2016), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21699466-eu-gambling-its-
reputation -secure-its -borders -europes -murky-deal-turkey; Jonathan Stearns, EU's
Refugee Pact With Turkey May Collapse Over Visa Dispute, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
25, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/europe-s -refugee-
pact-with-turkey-may-collapse-over-visa-dispute.
163. Lee, supra note 91, at 536 37 (citing Covey T. Oliver, Legal Remedies
and Sanctions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES
TO ALIENS 61, 71 (R. Lillich ed., 1983)).
164. See generallyANNEKE SMIT, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: BEYOND RESTITUTION (2012) (describing how
protection of property rights can help to provide durable solutions for refugees).
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costs. 165 Conceptually, however, there is no reason why compensation
must be limited to such "economic" losses. The heart of the refugee
crisis is not simply the obvious economic harm that refugees endure,
but the emotional suffering, terror, and anguish they suffer along the
way. 166 As Schuck puts it, refugees "are of special humanitarian
concern because they were compelled to abandon the only protections
and solaces that can render the harsh vicissitudes of life endurable:
the assistance (however minimal) of their own governments and the
social supports of their customary communities." 16 The compensable
harm done to refugees is not only a denial of property and livelihood,
but of citizenship itself.
The second function that a damages award could serve-and
which should therefore guide its calculation-is as a punishment for
the country of origin, and thereby a deterrent to future wrongdoing by
that nation or others. The legality of this function under existing
international law may be more questionable because it goes beyond
immediate humanitarian needs 168 and presents a more direct
challenge to the sovereignty and dignity of countries of origin. Yet, as
other scholars have noted, compensation awards could help deter the
kind of legal violations described above. 169
165. Lee, supra note 91, at 546 ("[T]he General Assembly has refrained
from passing judgment on whether countries of origin are obliged to compensate
refugees for such other losses as deaths; personal injuries and indignities;
wrongful arrest, detention or imprisonment; and emotional or mental anguish.").
166. Hannah R. Garry, The Right to Compensation and Refugee Flows: A
Preventative Mechanism'in International Law?, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 97, 114
(1998) (discussing need to "determine monetary compensation for non-material
damages such as certain human rights violations"); John Quigley, State
Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 380 (1999)
("While international organs have not addressed this matter, it would seem to
include compensation for the indignity and hardship of the departure, for loss of
property left behind, and for reduced income if, as is typically the case, a person
loses income as a result of being taken from her native area.").
167. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 246.
168. Sazak, supra note 62, at 310 ("[C]ompensation should be remedial, not
punitive, and designed to assist in humanitarian relief.").
169. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 385-86 (noting that compensation
"could positively translate into increased efforts by these States to achieve
economic growth and promote the just distribution of resources in order to provide
for and ensure the adequate living conditions of their citizens, thereby
discouraging immigration in a construction manner"); Lee, supra note 91, at 566
("What could be a more fitting sanction than requiring countries of origin to pay
compensation to refugees and countries of asylum? In addition to serving the end
of justice, such a sanction would inevitably have a deterrent effect. Such is the
purpose and function of law.").
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The third function of the financial claim would be to induce
potential host nations to accept refugees in exchange for the right to
pursue the claim. Since part of the goal here is to provide an effective
incentive to host nations, the amount of the claim could involve
consideration of the expected cost of accepting the refugees-not only
the direct costs of feeding and sheltering them, but social costs and
indirect burdens. 170 The focus here would be on capacity rather than
on harm or moral responsibility, 17 ' and it would be unnecessary if the
compensatory and punitive amounts already met or exceeded the
capacity cost.
4. How to Trade
Our goal is to give refugees an asset that they can trade to
potential host nations in exchange for accepting them. This objective
distinguishes our proposal from the standard compensation model
and provides a link between refugees and would-be host nations.
Doing so represents an improvement over the first wave of
market-based proposals, under which "asylum-seekers would largely
be removed from the realm of law and consigned to the realm of
political bargaining." 
17 2
What it would mean for a host nation to "accept" refugees
could vary, and we are inclined to avoid imposing mandatory terms
other than those that already exist in international refugee law.1 7 3
170. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 381-82 (noting that such a
calculation "should not only take into account the out-of-pocket money spent on
needy migrants. The calculation should also consider the social costs and indirect
burdens, which include long-term and short-term costs as well as the benefits the
host country will enjoy as a result of the refugees' immigration."). Precise figures
are unlikely. Gregor Noll, Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-
Sharing in the Asylum Field, 16(3) J. REFUGEE STUDS. 236, 244 (2003) ('While it
is comparatively easy to determine the costs of food and housing in money terms,
putting figures on the costs of integration is much more difficult, if not
impossible.").
171. David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, 9(4) J. POL. PHIL. 453, 460
(2001) (arguing that a principle of moral responsibility "looks too exclusively to
the past in assigning remedial responsibilities" rather than to the future and the
principle of capacity); id. at 468 ("[W]e might conclude that capacity, and to some
extent community, are relevant principles when immediate responsibilities are
being distributed because these are criteria that tell us who is best able to relieve
P's condition quickly and effectively.").
172. Anker et al., supra note 44, at 305.
173. See generally MICHELLE FOSTER & JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF
REFUGEE STATUS (2d ed. 2014) (arguing that states party to the Refugee
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The most straightforward cases would be those in which a host nation
offers permanent resettlement and fully takes over the refugees'
claims as a result. But permanent resettlement is not the norm,
17 4
and indeed "[t]emporary refuge is the keystone of the refugee
protection structure."' 17 5 This is not simply because host nations seek
to get rid of the refugees they have accepted, but because those
refugees often seek repatriation, 1 7 6 which has long been a central goal
of international refugee law. If this durable solution can be
achieved, 1 7 7 there may be reasons to pursue it.
Timing presents a thorny problem as well. Refugees are by
definition fleeing persecution, often in desperate need and hardly in a
good position for protracted bargaining with potential host nations.
The need for immediate shelter and the potential imbalances between
refugees and nations raise serious concerns about whether the "trade"
should happen before or after the refugees find refuge-as a
prerequisite for acceptance and protection or as something more akin
to a post hoc remedy.
We think it can be both. We support the rule of non-
refoulement, so we believe that refugees should be legally entitled to
protection in whatever country they happen to reach (and to which
they might then trade their asset). But, as the crisis in Europe shows,
refugees do not always choose to stay in the place where they first
arrive, which opens up the possibility for some ex ante bargaining
with other countries. Moreover, the protracted nature of many
refugee crises indicates, unfortunately, that there is time to identify
potential welfare-enhancing trades.
In these cases, the size of the claim would have to be adjusted
accordingly. It does not make sense to compensate refugees (or their
host nations) identically for temporary stays and permanent ones.
Just as others have suggested that refugees' duration of stay in a host
nation could be pegged to the seriousness of the threat faced in the
Convention are bound to provide refugees with a catalog of civil and socio-
economic rights).
174. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 269.
175. Id. at 268.
176. UNHCR, Preface to VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION, Preface (1996) (noting that the purpose of international protection is
not permanent refugee status, but "renewed membership of a community and the
restoration of national protection, either in the homeland or through integration
elsewhere").
177. Hathaway, Asylum Muddle, supra note 16 (suggesting that
repatriation should be made within seven years, if at all).
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country of origin, 1 7 8 under our plan the claims and debt would need to
be divided or prorated accordingly. Importantly, just as is in the
current system, the host nation's agreement would be monitored to
ensure that it holds up its end of the bargain. 1
7 9
C. Enforcement
The financial claim against the country of origin is the fuel for
our proposal, and in order for the mechanism to work, that claim
must have value, which means that it must be enforceable.
It has not always been easy to collect debts from sovereigns.
Indeed, one of the major problems with prior proposals for refugee
compensation is that they do not provide realistic enforcement
mechanisms. Refugees, in particular, are typically not in a good
position to demand payment from a sovereign, 18 0 even assuming that
they can establish legal standing in the first place.
Our proposal ameliorates this problem by incentivizing the
transfer of the asset to a party that is in a better position to collect it:
namely, the host nation-a sovereign-that accepts the refugees. The
debt is likely to be more valuable to the host nation, which has better
options for enforcing it. In some cases, the host nation may be able to
simply offset any existing obligations it has to the country of origin.
This option is attractive because it does not require anyone to write a
check; rather it treats existing debts as the relevant "pool" of money.
And because refugee flows and trade relationships are usually
regionally concentrated, there should be an overlap between the
178. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 139 ("We believe that it makes
sense to define the duration of stay for refugees as a function of the risk that gives
rise to the duty to admit them."); Lee, supra note 91, at 566 ("There is, in general,
an inverse relationship between voluntary repatriation and compensation;
namely, the greater the opportunity for refugees to be repatriated, the less the
need for compensation, and vice versa."); UNHCR, supra note 176, at 9 (providing
that Repatriation is permissible when the "root cause" of flight has been resolved
by a fundamental change in the country of origin that is substantial, effective, and
durable).
179. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 292 ("[M]onitoring
compliance should not be particularly difficult, as UNHCR can readily count
refugees, verify their destinations, and record transaction among states.").
180. Peretz, supra note 127, at 18 ("[C]ompensation is unlikely to consist of
large amounts of cash or promissory obligations to individuals. It will no doubt be
based on some form of global payment taking into account claims that parties to
the conflict have against each other .... ).
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countries to which refugees flee and the countries that have
obligations available for offset.
Where offsets are unavailable, the host nation could pursue
the debt through other means, including litigation. A money
judgment against a sovereign is a liability, just like any other
sovereign debt. The nature and value of sovereign debts are directly
tied to the mechanisms available for enforcing them. If, for example,
the holder of the judgment is stuck going to the local courts of the
misbehaving sovereign to try to get the judgment enforced, he or she
is unlikely to find success. By contrast, a judgment enforceable in
New York or London, denominated in US dollars or Euros, is, in
general, more valuable.
Few modern sovereigns, North Korea aside, are willing or
able to function without access to international financial and
commercial markets. Even the weakest nations are constantly
engaged in cross-border transactions. And the weaker those nations
are, the more likely they are to need the assistance of financial
institutions in New York and London. What would have to happen for
the judgment to be given teeth, then, is for courts in these
jurisdictions to use their considerable power to say that until the
judgment is paid, the misbehaving nation will be constrained from
using those jurisdictions for its commercial activities.
The federal courts in New York did precisely this when
Argentina blatantly ignored its contractual obligations on prior debts
by paying some creditors and ignoring others. The courts ruled that
any party under their jurisdiction that accepted payment from
Argentina in violation of Argentina's obligation to pay all its equally
ranked creditors on a proportional basis was risking contempt
sanctions. 181 The result is that Argentina has essentially been closed
out of the international financial markets. 182 A critic might point out
that Argentina avoided paying its creditors for more than a decade of
litigation in New York and elsewhere. For present purposes, the point
is that creditors who can bring claims in foreign jurisdictions,
particularly in the financial capitals, have the ability to impose
181. See generally NML Cap. v. Rep. of Arg., Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir.
2012).
182. For details, see Anna Gelpern & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Injunctions
Tn Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 189 (2014).
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powerful sanctions on misbehaving sovereigns. And higher sanctions
mean a higher likelihood of recovery. 
183
All that is necessary is for a few key jurisdictions-the ones in
the world's financial centers-to pass laws allowing enforcement.
184
And these key jurisdictions have strong incentives to help find ways
to ameliorate the current refugee crisis, in part because they are
typically the places where refugees want to go the most. A useful
analogy here is the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law on cross-border insolvency, which
provides that certain insolvency restructurings will be recognized and
given effect by the courts of countries that adopt the model law. The
UNCITRAL model has only been adopted by a handful of countries
with the strongest incentives to make this work, but it has been
remarkably effective because those countries-including the US and
UK-are among the handful of jurisdictions containing the world's
major financial centers. In practice, enforcement by the local courts of
the world's financial centers is de facto global enforcement. 185
The jurisdictional obstacle is not the only impediment to full
recovery. Even if courts in jurisdictions like New York and London
are aggressive in constraining the sovereign from doing business
there, a sovereign can hold out for a long time if it is determined
enough. The result has been that litigating against a sovereign tends
to only be worthwhile either for people that specialize in such actions
or those who are owed debts by the sovereign in question. In the case
of the former, these specialists (often referred to as "vulture funds")
tend to have both the legal expertise and financial resources to
pursue the recalcitrant sovereign's assets in whichever jurisdictions
around the world that those assets might show up.186 NML, the most
183. Many sovereigns faced with lawsuits on unpaid debts have paid. Still
others, including Greece in 2012, have refrained from defaulting on disfavored
creditors out of a fear of being subject to Argentine-style litigation.
184. The Security Council could perhaps facilitate this-it has previously
passed binding resolutions regarding Iraqi oil revenues and debt, for example. See
Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The Problem of Holdout
Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings, BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT'L
BANKING & FIN. L. 191 (2013).
185. For an illustration of this point in a different context by an eminent
practitioner, see Francis Fitzherbert-Brockholes, Letter to the Editor, Model Law
is Key to Protecting "Unprotected" Debt, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/le7f9980-7be6- 11e4-a695-00144feabdc0.
186. Indeed, these hedge funds sometimes assert that their goal is to
promote the rule of law by helping to hold corrupt governments accountable
(while making appropriate profits). See, e.g., David Bosco, The Debt Frenzy,
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famous of these funds, has pursued a wide range of Argentine assets
in courts in Paris, New York, London, Hong Kong, Accra, and Las
Vegas. 187
Mechanisms are available to facilitate such enforcement.
Assets with uncertain future value can be converted into assets with
immediate value using financial engineering. Sovereigns have, for
example, converted their highly uncertain expectation of future oil
revenues into present assets using what are called oil warrants. In
the case of refugee compensation, the judgment could be put into a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The management of the SPV could
issue bonds against its asset so that the bond proceeds would
immediately be available for the refugees.
To the extent the UNHCR and the international community
were willing to supplement the SPV's assets, they might provide the
SPV with additional pots of capital to support it financially.
Alternatively, friendly sovereigns or the UNHCR could provide
guarantees during the initial few years that the SPV makes its
interest and principal payments. These types of guarantees of
principal were used to great effect during the restructurings of Latin
American sovereign debt in the 1980s in what are often referred to as
the Brady Bonds. 188
Because municipal courts should be sufficient to handle the
claims we have described, the establishment of a new international
forum is not crucial to our proposal, though (as with the creation of a
treaty implementing the system) we would not be opposed to it, either
as a general matter or for particular refugee scenarios. This, however,
would require a change in law. For despite the plethora of
international materials-treaties, conventions, statements, practice,
and academic treatments-saying that the creation of refugees by a
nation violates international law, 18 9 the international community has
not provided a dedicated forum to adjudicate such violations.
FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 13, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/the-debt-
frenzy/.
187. See, e.g., Jacob Goldstein, Why A Hedge Fund Seized An Argentine
Navy Ship In Ghana, NPR (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/
2012/10/22/163384810/why-a-hedge-fund-seized-an-argentine-navy-ship-in-ghana
(reporting that NML filed suit in Ghana to seize an Argentine Navy ship docked
in that country as partial repayment of Argentina's debt).
188. Salomon Smith Barney, A Primer on Brady Bonds, HARv. Bus. SCH.
(Mar. 9, 2000), http://www.people.hbs.edu/besty/projfinportal/ssb%20brady%20
primer.pdf.
189. See supra Section II.A.
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There are, however, some guideposts available. The
conceptual foundations of such a forum could be laid using the
expertise that has been developed in setting up expert tribunals such
as the International Criminal Court, which is the court of last resort
for alleged perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. 190 There are also a number of human rights tribunals such
as the European Court of Human Rights, and those of the
Organization of American States and the African Union. 191 Perhaps
more importantly, a wide range of tribunals and compensation
commissions have been established in order to make the kinds of
determinations we describe above. Consider, for example, the United
Nations Compensation Commission in Iraq, the US-Iran Claims
Tribunal, and the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced
Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same could be
done for refugees, either as a general matter or-as with Bosnia-on
an ad hoc basis. 192
In the case of refugees, there already exists a respected
international body, the UNHCR, which has expertise in the matter. 193
The UNHCR has been hampered by a lack of funding, 194 a byproduct
of the fact that the vast majority of its financial support is voluntarily
provided.1 95  But it has long been the central institution of
190. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudcation, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997)
(outlining the factors that could lead to effective supranational adjudication).
191. These include the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the African Court on Human and People's
Rights, and the International Criminal Court.
192. Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 1, 38 (2000) ('Where large
numbers of persons suffer quantifiable losses, an international tribunal or
compensation commission might be established to award compensation.").
193. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 196 ("[The] UNHCR is, of course,
the primary intergovernmental organization charged with the responsibility for
refugee protection ....... ); Achiume, supra note 67, at 729 ("[S]uccessfully
promoting international cooperation for refugee cost-sharing under [the
Responsibility to Protect] requires a central issue-linking actor ... and a natural
choice for this role is the UN Refugee Agency.").
194. Arulanantham, supra note 25, at 46 ("Spending constraints in the
current system unduly restrict the UNHCR's ability to fulfill its protection
responsibilities.").
195. Sazak, supra note 62, at 309 ("The agency receives around 2 percent of
its funds from the UN general budget and the remainder, exceeding $1 billion, is
raised through voluntary contributions from UN member states and other
donors."); Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 141 ("[A]ny fiscal assistance
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international refugee law and policy, and could play-perhaps not
simultaneously-many of the roles required by our proposal. It could,
for example, help establish and staff the forum. It could perform the
valuation described above. Or, perhaps most usefully, it could serve
as a kind of trustee for refugee groups. After all, the UNHCR has a
comparative advantage vis-a-vis refugees when it comes to
establishing their right to compensation in the first place. 196 As a
group, the refugees themselves are ill-suited to bring a claim, 197 let
alone enforce it. They are likely to be a dispersed, impoverished, and
uncoordinated group. Allowing the UNHCR to bring the claim on
behalf of both the refugees (who need assistance because their
statehood has been taken from them) and the international system
(which bears the responsibility and costs of relocating the refugees)
would facilitate enforcement. 198 As in other trustee contexts, the
UNHCR would essentially serve as a representative with a fiduciary
duty to the refugees, taking advantage of its expertise, standing, and
resources. This would entail a shift in role for the organization, and, if
that role would be better played by some new international refugee
agency, that would be just as well.
III. OBJECTIONS AND FURTHER CONCERNS
There are many possible objections to our proposal. Below, we
address the ones that commenters bring up most often: workability,
undermining existing protections, and commodification. 99
received from other countries of the UNHCR is a matter of charity, not of
obligation, and is not distributed solely on the basis of relative need.").
196. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 391 ("With respect to State of origin
liability, the UNHCR would facilitate compensating the host countries. Efforts to
claim the compensation could be made either directly by the host country or
through the UNHCR.").
197. Lee, supra note 91, at 552 ("[R]efugees lack the procedural capacity to
institute proceedings against their own governments.").
198. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 180 (Apr. 11) (suggesting in an advisory
opinion that the United Nations can bring a claim against a state for damages
caused "[t]o the interests of which it is the guardian").
199. See Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 289 (noting the same
three objections: unworkability, quality of protection, and commodification).
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A. Workability
One might object to the workability of our proposal on at least
two dimensions: the difficulty of enforcement and possible systemic
costs to the refugee-creating nation.
1. Enforcement
As a historical matter, it has been hard to get sovereigns to
fulfill their humanitarian obligations.200 This is especially true when
those obligations run to a set of people who are neither taxpayers nor
voters, are lacking in capital, and do not have powerful allies
advocating their causes. For our proposal to work, this problem of
enforcement must be surmountable.
We have noted the imperfect enforcement of obligations under
international refugee law. But in the context of sovereign debt, a
contrasting pattern emerges. Those studying the sovereign debt
market have puzzled for years about why countries adhere so
strongly to their obligations to pay, even where the creditors have
minimal enforcement options and the sovereigns have strong legal
and moral grounds to refuse.2"1
Scholars disagree about why sovereigns are so diligent about
paying their debts, but some explanations are easy enough to
imagine. Because nations depend on international financial markets,
and specifically on access to credit, they cannot simply ignore their
international debt obligations. The best case result of doing so would
be an increase in the cost of credit; the worst case would be exclusion
from the market altogether. So long as the market recognizes the
refugee debt as valid, the oppressive nation cannot ignore it. A
natural question here is whether increasing the size of a nation's debt
will make it less likely that the sovereign will pay as a general
matter. Undoubtedly so (higher debt means a higher likelihood of
default), but that is no reason to deny the refugees their debt claim
200. POSNER, supra note 48.
201. See, e.g., Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, Sovereign Debt, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 647, 647 (Gita Gopinath et al. eds.,
2014) (discussing the mechanisms which induce countries to fulfill the terms of
their contracts, even when creditors have "limited legal resources"); LEE C.
BUCHHEIT ET AL., BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY
(2013) (arguing that sovereign states should accept international reform proposals
despite creditors and debtors feeling that "there were sufficient instruments for
addressing debt crises ad hoc"), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
reports/2013/10/sovereign -debt.
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and effectively privilege other claims. If anything, a priority claim
should go to the refugee debt since it was thrust on them, not
voluntarily contracted.
Another factor is that the courts of other nations, while often
reluctant to sanction fellow nations for humanitarian misbehavior,
have been increasingly willing to engage in even extra-territorial
enforcement against other nations when it comes to delinquency on
debt payments. The fact that US courts have essentially shut down
Argentina's access to the international financial markets for more
than a decade now, despite Argentina's need for foreign currency, is
Exhibit A. It is also possible that the authority of the General
Assembly or the Security Council could be brought to bear. The
General Assembly can, in theory, collect the debt by withholding
funding that would otherwise be distributed through agencies; and
the Security Council (through instructions to members) can order
assets freezes or seizures.20 2
For our purposes, the specific reasons are not essential. The
point is that governments work hard to pay their sovereign debts.
Simultaneously, they sometimes ignore or avoid their international
legal obligations vis-h-vis refugees. In part, our goal is to achieve the
latter by converting them into the former-by, in part, monetizing
humanitarian obligations.
Regardless of the mechanisms of enforcement, some nations
will be more attractive targets than others and some will effectively
be judgment proof.203 This could introduce inequalities, since host
nations will be more willing to accept refugees from countries of
origin against which a debt is likely to be enforceable. For example, a
relatively rich nation that has extended credit to its neighbors and is
generating refugees through oppression would be a good target,
because the neighbors could accept the refugees coming across their
borders and thereby free themselves from existing obligations.
202. Lee, supra note 91, at 547-48; see also Goodwin-Gill & Sazak, supra
note 26 (using the example of the actions taken by the U.N. Security Council
during the first Gulf war to ensure compensation to victims of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait).
203. Jack I. Garvey, The New Asylum Seekers: Addressing their Origin, in
THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s 181, 194 (David A.
Martin ed., 1988) ("[I]n some situations of refugee flow, particularly the flow that
is all too common from poor third world countries, actual compensation will not be
practicable.").
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The foregoing may not be aesthetically pleasing, but it is a
reality of the existing system. Nations already "rank" refugees
according to their desirability, economic or otherwise.204 (Witness the
United States' differing responses to refugees from Haiti and from
Cuba.) Our hope is simply that our proposal would make it easier for
more refugees to find protection.
Although it is not strictly necessary for our proposal, the
establishment of a standing fund would facilitate its success. Such a
fund could be used to provide timely payment to host nations who
accept refugees-lessening the perceived risk of delayed
enforcement-and then be replenished by whatever funds can
eventually be collected from countries of origin.
2. Further Destabilizing the Refugee-Creating Nation
A second face of the workability objection is the risk of further
destabilizing the country of origin. Efforts to impose financial
damages can contribute to radicalization or further systemic
costs-one need look no further than inter-war Germany or
present-day Greece. Moreover, it might simply be unfair to saddle the
nation with a debt because of the oppressive behavior of its
government, particularly if that government is undemocratic in the
first place. Doing so would put the remaining citizens of the
country-who might themselves have been victims of oppression-on
the hook for payments to the refugees created by the prior malefactor
government.
We have no quarrel with the general point that it is
problematic for democratic successor governments to be liable for the
debts of a prior oppressive and unrepresentative regime. And perhaps
the international legal system should put in place a mechanism to
obviate some of these debt obligations. But even if the international
legal system recognizes a category of odious debts that do not have to
be paid, refugee debts should be among those least likely to fall
within this category. Creditors who contract with an oppressive
regime know (or should know) what they are doing. By contrast,
refugees are akin to tort victims. They have little choice in becoming
creditors, and their condition was forced upon them-in violation of
international law-because they were weak.
204. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 287 ("The political reality is
that states would be even more reluctant to accept refugees for protection if they
could not pick and choose in this fashion.").
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Preserving the debt is even less troubling if the oppressive
government has targeted a minority population and forced it into
refugee status in order to curry favor with its majority population. If
our proposed reform helps deter that instinct, all the better.
More generally, in a situation where oppression is occurring,
someone is going to get stuck with the "cost." The current system
leaves that cost with the refugees themselves, and to a lesser extent
with the other nations that might or might not choose to let them in.
This is both unfair and inefficient-the costs are not necessarily
imposed on culpable parties or on the least cost avoiders. Putting the
cost on the other citizens of the oppressive nation would at least give
them an increased incentive to depose their government before their
fellow citizens are forced to become refugees. Those other citizens are,
in all likelihood, better positioned to do so than those forced into
refugee status.
It is worth noting, however, that our proposal might very well
reduce the likelihood of repatriation, both by weakening countries of
origin and by heightening tensions between them and host nations
(which would be pursuing the debts). In this regard, however, we are
in keeping with the general trend in international refugee law and
policy over the past few decades, which has seen increasing
acceptance of durable solutions other than repatriation.
Importantly, the debt we describe would be different both in
design and operation from a traditional sanctions regime. Sanctions
are punitive in nature-a way to punish bad-behaving nations and
hopefully deter bad behavior in the future. The refugee debt would
have a punitive character, but that is not its main function. It is more
like a judgment for compensatory damages-one owed by the
oppressor nation to the refugees directly, but which is to be used to
mitigate the costs to whatever nation takes them in. It would have to
be calculated with those functions in mind and with sensitivity to the
country's circumstances. The goal is not to contribute to weakness
and instability nor to create the conditions for a renewed dictatorship
or a failed state.
B. Undermining Refugees' Protection
Potentially more serious than the workability concern is the
claim that our proposal weakens refugees' already-precarious
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protections.2 5 Like the authors of previous market-based proposals,
we believe "the kinds of reform we propose can be undertaken
without amending the formal legal obligations owed to refugees. ' '206
But because we are relying on incentives, we must address them
directly.
1. Bad Incentives for Countries of Origin
Because the debt we have described here would only attach if
and when a persecuted people reached another nation, countries of
origin would have more reason to prevent people from escaping, and
instead would, for example, round them up and trap them in camps,
as Myanmar did with more than 100,000 Rohingya.207
Our proposal, however, incorporates existing international
obligations and principles, including prohibitions on genocide and the
still-aspirational norm of the responsibility to protect. 28 A nation
that massacres its people or forbids them to leave would be subject to
those rules and principles in our system no less than in the current
system. 20 9 Indeed, our proposal simply does not apply in cases of
genocide, when the more pressing questions will involve the
permissibility of intervention or the applicability of the responsibility
to protect.
205. Anker et al., supra note 44, at 296 ("[D]espite the authors' good
intentions, the proposals will have the practical effect of de-emphasizing the
existing protection responsibilities of states toward refugees under international
law, and thus risk aggravating the failures of protection that the authors wish to
cure.").
206. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 156.
207. Thomas Fuller, Myanmar to Bar Rohingya From Fleeing, But Won't
Address Their Plight, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
06/13/world/asia/myanmar-to-bar-rohingya-from-fleeing-but-wont-address-their-
plight.html; cf Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 130-31 ("Refugee protection
frequently amounts to a system of prolonged 'warehousing' in which refugees are
denied the right to integrate in the asylum state, yet are unlikely to restored to
meaningful membership in their home community.").
208. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 621 ("I am not resistant to dreams, and I
would never suggest that it is futile to aim high. In the meantime, however, we
must design asylum procedures for the world we actually inhabit, not for the
world we wish we had."); Schuck, Response, supra note 62, at 388 ("I am all for
reiterating these pieties and exhortations (I really am), even though governments
have consistently ignored them ever since the Flood.").
209. G.A. Res. 217A (III) art. 13(2), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948)
("Everyone has a right to leave any country, including his own .. "). See also
Kritzman-Amir, supra note 64, at 386 n.188 ("[C]urrently, the right to leave a
country is relatively well recognized and protected.").
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Our story is one of incentives, so it is not satisfactory to rely
completely on existing obligations as a safety net. There are, however,
ways to use our debt-centered system to further discourage this kind
of internal oppression. One possibility would be to extend the system
to internally displaced peoples. This would represent a larger
imposition on the sovereignty of the country of origin, which would
now be financially liable for things it does within its own borders. But
nations that fall into this category are already violating international
law and simply are not facing any sanctions for it.
Another way to disincentivize genocide would be to say that
the oppressive country's debt would remain in place if it massacred
the targeted group. This raises practical questions-who would get to
enforce the "benefit" of the debt, if there are no refugees to accept?-
but these are no more insurmountable than the kinds of questions
that arise in the current system. There would be no host nation in
this scenario, but perhaps the claim could be allocated to whatever
nation accepts a related class of refugees or takes on some other
responsibility relating to their care.
2. Bad Incentives for Host Nations
Our system rewards host nations for accepting refugees, but
provides no additional incentive to treat them well. 210 The concern
remains that host nations could use their positions to bargain
unfairly with needy refugees, or perhaps accept them, collect their
debts, and then neglect or harm them.
The latter concern arose during discussions of the 1992 Cairo
Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to
Refugees, which provides that "[a] State is obligated to compensate
its own nationals forced to leave their homes to the same extent as it
is obligated by international law to compensate an alien. ' 211 The
Declaration went on to reiterate, as we do:
The possibility that refugees or UNHCR may one day
successfully claim compensation from the country of
origin should not serve as a pretext for withholding
humanitarian assistance to refugees or refusing to
210. See, e.g., Arulanantham, supra note 25, at 36-37; Schuck, Modest
Proposal, supra note 2, at 294 (discussing "Quality-of Protection Objection").
211. Luke T. Lee, The Cairo Declaration of Princiqles, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
157, 158 (1993).
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join in international burden-sharing meant to meet
the needs of refugees or otherwise to provide durable
solutions, including mediation to facilitate voluntary
repatriation in dignity and security, thereby removing
or reducing the necessity to pay compensation. 212
Nations would therefore have a continuing legal duty not to return
refugees to a country where they would face persecution.
It is worth emphasizing that we would not lessen, let alone
erase, nations' existing palliative duties. Our proposal would,
however, give better incentives for performing those duties. Host
nations could not hold out for a tabulation of debt as a condition of
non-refoulement, but they could essentially send the bill to the
relevant countries of origin.
Analogous rules exist in other areas of law, albeit not on an
international scale.2 13 Some tort doctrines require individuals to
assist those in need, but also permit them to file suit for the costs of
the aid, which might be collected directly from the needy party, or-
directly or indirectly-from the person who created the need. Luke
Lee points to the law of quasi-contractual relations and quotes
Corbin's example: "Under compulsion of law,... A makes payment of
money that it was B's legal duty to pay. In spite of any express
refusal, B is under a quasi contractual duty to reimburse A."
214
It is true that nothing in our system that directly penalizes a
host nation if, for example, it provides refugees with substandard
care. We hope, however, to further disincentivize such treatment. We
suspect that host nations mistreat refugees when they are seen as a
costly burden; alleviating the burden should therefore improve the
treatment. If our system works well, countries might even compete to
take in refugees. Instead of housing them in makeshift prison-like
camps rife with disease, violence, abuse, and the like, they might plan
ahead by building the kinds of structures that would provide at least
minimally decent conditions. Instead of running advertisements
212. Id. at 159.
213. It should be noted, though, that "[i]n general, international
applications of the basic principle of compensatory damages follows the common
usages of municipal legal system in this regard." Oliver, supra note 163, at 71.
214. Lee, supra note 91, at 557 (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts 47-48
(1963)). Schuck also points to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, which requires the federal government to reimburse state
and local governments for the cost of complying with some federally-imposed
requirements. See Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 262 n.72.
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trying to deter them from seeking refuge by telling them that they
will be unwelcome,2 15 perhaps the converse could occur. (One might
even argue that if the proposal works "too well" then potential host
nations would have incentive to destabilize their neighbors so as to
cash in on valuable refugee flows. This strikes us as far-fetched,
though, and in any event a blameless country of origin would not be
liable under our rules.)
The risk of unequal bargaining is a serious one. Host nations
might lowball refugees, taking advantage of their immediate and
pressing needs and thereby depressing the value of their asset. But
because nations would not be freed of their existing obligations, the
risk of such a holdout should not be any higher than the current
incentive nations have to refuse refugees outright. If a group of
refugees managed to reach Country A, thereby gaining protection, it
could then try to bargain with Countries B, C, and D for a more
permanent status. Country A might even be willing to pitch in, as
demonstrated in the EU-Turkey deal (which, because it did not take
the refugees' own preferences into account, offered less protection
than our proposal would).
Ongoing monitoring and periodic payments (rather than a
lump sum) can help incentivize this behavior. As long as nations can
count on compensation for satisfactorily hosting refugees, they would
have increased incentive to build their reputations for being good
rather than bad places to land.
3. Bad Incentives for Potential Refugees
Finally, we reach the extreme conclusion of the cynical
approach: the possibility that our system would give perverse
incentives to potential refugees. If nations with a better standard of
living are willing to grant homes to refugees, but not other types of
immigrants, then some subsets of people might have an incentive to
exaggerate the degree of their persecution so as to fit into the
category of refugee.216 Worse, these people might actually exacerbate
the problem in their home nations by "courting genocide. 2
215. See, e.g., Denmark Advert Th Lebanon Newspapers Warns Off
Refugees, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2015/09/denmark-advert-lebanon-newspapers-warns-refugees- 150907225146384.
html.
216. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 142 ("[S]ome persons who are not
at risk in their own country make asylum claims in developed countries as the
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The last scenario strikes us as implausible under most
conditions. But more to the point, our system envisions a legal
determination by a tribunal of the degree to which a particular nation
bears responsibility for a refugee problem. Exaggerated claims are
bound to show up on both sides in this context. Sorting through those
claims will be the task of the tribunal that hears the claims.
C. Commodification
Prior market-based proposals in this area have been met with
criticism from those who oppose the very idea of market-based
approaches to humanitarian crises. Such proposals have been called
"unconscionable, '2 18 "repugnant,"219 "morally troubling,""22 and so on.
Schuck, who put forth a prior market-based proposal,
responded by saying that "'commodification' and 'placing a price upon
the fate of refugees' are simplistic, unhelpful labels that avoid the
tragic choice" between "the total amount of protection and the quality
of protection.""22 We agree, although to some degree, we do seek to
avoid this tragic choice by increasing the total incentives for host
nations to provide protection, and thereby making the pie bigger.
That is not to say that we can entirely avoid the
commodification objection. Critics might argue that the very act of
commodifying refugee protection will undermine our goal. Perhaps
countries of origin will now see oppression as a priced option, and
potential host nations will come to see protection of refugees as an
optional service, rather than as an obligation.222
basis for securing at least physical admission into their desired country of
immigration.").
217. Jide Nzelibe, Courting Genocide: The Umntended Effects of
Humanitarian Intervention, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1172-73 (2009) ("Because
humanitarian interventions tend to increase the chance that rebel leaders are
going to achieve their preferred political objectives, rebel leaders might have an
incentive to engage in the kinds of provocative actions that make atrocities
against their followers more likely in the first place.").
218. Smith, supra note 90, at 137.
219. Id. at 149.
220. Anker et al., supra note 44, at 306 ("While we recognize the burdens
mass influx can impose on asylum states, we find this characterization [of refugee
flows being like insurable risk] to be morally troubling.").
221. Schuck, Response, supra note 62, at 387 ("These are epithets designed
to end this debate rather than enrich it.").
222. Anker et al., supra note 44, at 304 ("By encouraging developed states
to treat physical protection of refugees as an object for bargaining, these proposals
may jeopardize the safety of asylum-seekers.").
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In any event, that ship has sailed. 223 Refugees are already
commodified, except that in the current regime they are usually
treated as nothing but a cost, as the very label "burden-sharing"
suggests. 224 Rich nations in the North pay nations in the South to
keep them away.225 Potential host nations-Thailand, Indonesia and
Malaysia, in the case of the Rohingya-perceive acceptance of
refugees as costly and, as a result, turn them away. The current
system treats refugees as a cost. We want to make them into more of
an asset. 226
At root, we suspect that the commodification criticism is
motivated by a sense that it is inappropriate-and at the least,
unseemly-for rich nations to buy and sell their obligations without
any input from the refugees themselves. The burden-sharing
proposals exemplify this characteristic: to the degree that they
represent a market solution, the buyers and sellers are all host
nations. Our proposal avoids this potential fault. For while we do
introduce a market by making the debt tradable, ultimately the
refugees themselves have a voice. This is not direct democracy, but it
gives refugees a kind of agency that is lacking in the current system
or in other proposals.
223. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 19, at 205-06 ("[T]he suggestion that
the shift proposed here would somehow 'allow' powerful governments to 'buy their
way out' of providing refuge takes no account of the fact that there is very little
left to buy. The developed world has already off-loaded most obligations onto the
South, but without paying anything for the privilege.").
224. Noll, supra note 170, at 237 ("The term 'burden-sharing' is a
problematic one. It appears to suggest that refugee protection is necessarily
burdensome."); Smith, supra note 90, at 151.
225. Schuck, Modest Proposal, supra note 2, at 282 83 ("Would states be
interested in paying others to protect refugees? The short answer is that they
already are doing so. In some refugee crises like Rwanda, some relatively wealthy
states contribute funds to the first-asylum state to support its protection efforts in
situ.").
226. Cf Betts, supra note 21, at 22 ("[T]he very concept of assuming that
asylum-seekers universally represent a 'cost' or 'burden' rather than a potential
'benefit,' ignores the possibility that the extant perceived costs might be
reconstructed within the developed 'purchasing' states."); Hathaway & Neve,
supra note 19, at 177 ("The objective should therefore be to treat refugees as
empowered agents for development instead of burdens on development.").
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CONCLUSION: A PILOT PROGRAM AND FURTHER APPLICATIONS
Our goal has been to offer a partial solution to the refugee
crisis by improving the incentives that international law presents to
countries of origin and potential host nations. We do not suppose that
our proposal would solve the global refugee crisis. Rather, it is a tool
that we think could help ameliorate the horror of some ongoing
tragedies. Let us therefore conclude where we began-with the plight
of the Rohingya, the "world's least wanted" people.227 Could the
three-part mechanism we have described help ameliorate their
situation? In broad terms, what would a pilot program look like?
The first step in our proposal is establishing that a state has
violated international law when it persecutes a subset of its people to
such a degree that it causes them to have to flee to another state. We
think it plausible that Myanmar has done exactly that. 228
The second step in our proposal is translating that violation
into a remedy. We have already described the legal steps needed to
make this happen and identified the factors that would go into the
actual calculation of compensation.22 9 As a practical matter, one
challenge for a pilot program would be identifying the relevant group
to receive the claim. This would be a surmountable obstacle because
the Rohingya are identifiably distinct from the rest of Burma. They
are geographically concentrated in the Arakhan/Rakhine state, they
speak Bengali rather than Burmese, and are Muslims in a majority
Buddhist nation (and region).2 30 Perhaps more relevantly, the
Burmese government has been able to single them out, so a remedial
scheme can simply follow the markers already laid down.
The third element is enforcement. Given the scale and
complexity of the Rohingya's situation, it might make sense to
establish a new tribunal, roughly akin to the Commission for Real
227. Dummett, supra note 5.
228. Observers have argued that the situation is so bad as to trigger the
international community's "responsibility to protect." See, e.g., GLOBAL CTR. FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, PERSECUTION OF THE ROHINGYA IN
BURMA/MYANMAR AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 2 (Mar. 5, 2015)
[hereinafter GLOBAL CTR.] (positing that the government "has allowed widespread
human rights violations, sometimes reaching the scale of mass atrocities, to
continue to be perpetrated against Rohingya").
229. See supra Part II.B.
230. Thomas K. Ragland, Burma's Rohingyas in Crisis: Protection of
'Humamtarian" Refugees Under International Law, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
301, 305 (1994).
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Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In the absence of such a tribunal, the International
Court of Justice would be a possible forum.
In the particular case of Myanmar, the Paris Club could also
serve as a readily available forum. The Paris Club is an informal
international forum run under the auspices of the French Tresor
where, since 1956, countries-usually developing countries that are
seeking to reenter global financial markets-have gone to clear their
obligations vis-h-vis other nations (typically the rich nations who
have claims against them for prior loans).231 Myanmar, because it was
seeking to reenter the international financial system, went to the
Paris Club voluntarily only a few years ago.232 Our guess is that it is
now hoping to tap the private debt markets using the clean bill of
health that it has received as a result of clearing its arrears with
other nations. If countries that accepted Rohingya refugees had debt
claims against Myanmar, those would have to be been settled at the
Paris Club. Indeed, if the global community were to recognize those
claims today, those claims could still be put on the table. We suspect
that Myanmar would work quite hard to make sure that it does not
have to clear more Paris Club claims from countries like Australia
and New Zealand before it can access the private markets. This would
give Myanmar a strong and concrete incentive to treat the Rohingya
better. 233
If the Paris Club option is not available for whatever reason,
claims could either be paid from the coffers of the Asian Development
Bank or World Bank in the form of deductions from loans that would
otherwise have been paid to Myanmar.2 34 Or, even more simply,
nations receiving the refugee flows-Thailand and Malaysia, for
example-could offset their own existing debts to Myanmar. It is not
coincidental that inter-sovereign economic relationships tend to
231. For the basics on the Paris Club, see ALEXIS REIFFEL,
RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD Hoc MACHINERY (2003).
232. Gwen Robinson, Myanmar Signs Deal with Foreign Creditors, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/9b2d6e4c-68b2-11e2-9a3f-
00144feab49a.
233. Other refugee -creating nations have also been to the Paris Club trying
to clear their arrears to fellow nations in recent years. For details on the roughly
ninety countries who have sought to renegotiate their official debts at the Paris
club, see PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org.
234. GLOBAL CTR., supra note 228, at 5 (noting that in 2013 the Asian
Development Bank and the World Bank approved major loans worth $512 and
$440 million, respectively, and that in January 2014 the World Bank announced
plans for a $2 billion multi-year development program).
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overlap with refugee flows. After all, nations tend to trade most with
their neighbors, just as refugees tend to flee to them.
To fully describe a pilot program proposal would require far
more detail and expertise than we have at our disposal. The foregoing
is meant to sketch the outlines and to suggest that such a proposal
may well be feasible. If in doing so we are able to facilitate acceptance
of even one existing group of refugees, we will consider the project a
success. But significant questions remain.
First, we have adopted international law's focus on
territoriality, and made countries of origin a major player in our
framework-in some sense, they are the antagonists in the story. But
the logic of our proposal might be read to support a different kind of
right to remedy, one whose duty belongs not necessarily to the
country of origin, but to the nation responsible for creating the
refugees in the first place. In some cases, fault-and therefore
obligation-could lie outside the borders of the country where the
refugees originated.
Second, again following the basic structure of international
law, we have limited our focus to refugees fleeing persecution. The
notion of culpability at the heart of our compensation proposal does
not translate directly into situations involving, for example, economic
migrants. The basic structure, however, may be applicable to those
scenarios, and we pursue it in related work. 235
Third, we have focused our attention on the incentives
currently facing nations with regard to contemporary refugees. But
the logic of our proposal would seem to support a system of reparation
for past injustice as well. Could refugees claim a debt from a country
of origin they left decades ago? Likewise, the logic of our proposal
might extend to other costs that nations incur as a result of others'
bad behavior. Should peacekeeping countries be able to send a bill to
the countries whose peace they keep, or-more directly relevant-
count their peacekeeping contributions against their refugee
obligations?2
36
Some readers will remain unconvinced by our efforts to
address the details. Others might be able to figure out better ways to
235. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66
DUE L.J. (forthcoming 2017); see also Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced
Secession, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2017).
236. Suhrke, Burden-Sharing, supra note 50, at 408-09 (noting that France
and the UK argued as much with regard to Yugoslavia).
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make refugees into more of an asset than a burden. We welcome
those interventions. We also suspect that some readers will reject or
even be outraged by our use of concepts like financial obligations,
sovereign debt trades, and the value of credit when discussing what
is, at root, a humanitarian crisis of the first degree. Perhaps it would
be a better world in which nations stopped treating refugees like
widgets to be distributed or warehoused, 237 and instead accepted
refugees without regard to the cost they impose. But in the world we
live in, ignoring this reality only compounds the tragedy.
237. Alvin E. Roth, Migrants Aren't Widgets, POLITICO.EU (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-arent-widgets-europe-eu-migrant-refugee-
crisis!.
2016]
